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The U.S. government has unfairly refused to grant asylum to lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) children and young adults who
fled their countries to escape persecution based on their sexual identities
These asylum denials are a conundrum: young people ought to be
particularly sympathetic claimants, and those seeking asylum based on
their sexual orientation have a twenty-year-old precedent for such claims.
This Article offers a novel theory to explain why this seemingly
sympathetic subset of individuals eligible for legal relief has been refused
it. Specifically, it contends that asylum adjudicators are in the grip of
"Popular Freudianism," whereby a person who is LGBT cannot be a child,
and a child cannot be LGBT. As such, the idea of an "LGBT child" is
treated as a paradox. This confounding nature of LGBT identity and
childhood leads immigration judges to unfairly deny LGBT children
asylum relief.
Asylum law was initially ahead of constitutional jurisprudence in
recognizing gay men as a persecuted minority in need of protection, but it
has since fallen behind evolving constitutional norms on the rights of
LGBT young people. After exploring the gulf between contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence and asylum law, the Article elucidates the
barriers confronting young LGBT asylum-seekers and makes
recommendations to improve the asylum adjudication system on their
behalf.
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INTRODUCTION
Kimumwe had presented no objective evidence to confirm his
homosexuality .. . [and his incarceration] . .. was based not
on [his] homosexual status, but on allegations of sexual
misconduct .... [He] failed to satisfy the burden of proof on
his asylum claim.'
Over twenty years ago, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
held that a gay man who faced homophobic persecution in his native
Cuba qualified for asylum in the U.S.' This recognition of anti-gay
persecution as a valid basis for asylum stood in stark contrast to
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence on the rights of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT") people. Only four years
earlier, the Supreme Court had upheld the validity of sodomy laws
that subjected LGBT people to criminal prosecution and
imprisonment.' Since then, the case law on LGBT rights has evolved
rapidly. Courts recognized a constitutional right not only to engage in
private same-sex sexual activity, but also to be free from anti-gay
Kimumwe v. Ashcroft, 431 F.3d 319, 321-23 (8th Cir. 2005).
2 See Toboso-Alfonso 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (B.I.A. 1990).
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
See Lawrence-v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
2011] 375
University of California, Davis
discrimination in a number of other areas.' While asylum law was
initially ahead of the curve in recognizing the rights of LGBT people, it
has fallen behind evolving legal norms on the treatment of sexual
minorities.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the adjudication of asylum claims
filed by LGBT children and young adults, who have not been able to
obtain relief even when they had legitimate asylum claims.' This is a
5 For example, several courts have ruled that marriage cannot be restricted only
to opposite-sex couples. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.2d 921 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (holding that Proposition 8, a ballot measure limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples, fails to advance any rational basis, prevents California from
fulfilling its constitutional obligation to provide marriages on an equal basis, and is
unconstitutional); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa. 2009) (barring same-sex
couples from marriage violates the equal protection provisions of the Iowa
Constitution); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples is invalid under the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution), superceded by constitutional amendment, CAL CONST. of 2009 art. I, § 7.5,
as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 77 (Cal. 2009) (reversing In re
Marriage Cases through California Proposition 8, codified as Marriage Protection Act);
Kerrigan v. Comm. Publ. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that statutory
scheme limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples "impermissibly discriminates
against gay persons on the basis of their sexual orientation"); Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples violated provisions of the state constitution guaranteeing individual
liberty and equality, and was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest),
appeal dismissed, 827 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 2005). See generally infra notes 128-160 and
accompanying text (providing additional examples of decisions upholding the rights
of LGBT people to be free of discrimination).
6 See infra notes 37-61 and accompanying text; see also Todorovic v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., 621 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010) (remanding case of young gay
man denied asylum and withholding of removal by the IJ and BIA because the IJ
determined that he "bears no effeminate traits . . . that would mark him as a
homosexual"); Barrios-Aguilar v. Holder, 387 F. App'x 587, 588-91 (9th Cir. 2010)
(remanding case of young man denied asylum by the IJ and BIA who entered the U.S.
at age 15 after being beaten, sexually assaulted and threatened for being gay); De
Paula v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 386 F. App'x 587, 588-91 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming
denial of asylum because the anti-gay harassment the applicant suffered as a child
"does not meet the extreme concept of persecution") (citations omitted); Illescas-
Dutan v. Mukasey, 271 F. App'x 109, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2008) (remanding case of young
gay man who fled to the U.S. as a teenager and was denied asylum by the IJ and BIA
despite evidence of arrest and detention of gay individuals in his home country); Liu
v. Attorney General, 278 F. App'x 212, 213 (3d Cir. 2008) (denying asylum to gay
man who had been beaten by his father and neighbors and expelled from school
because of his sexual orientation); Nabuwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th
Cir. 2007) (remanding case of young lesbian woman denied asylum by the IJ and BIA
whose family arranged for her to be raped in a bid to change her sexual orientation);
Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1027-29 (8th Cir. 2007) (remanding case of 22
year old gay man denied asylum by the 1J and BIA because his mannerisms did not
indicate that he was gay); Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 652-53 (8th Cir.
376 [Vol. 45:373
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conundrum because young people would appear to be particularly
sympathetic claimants.7 Young people seeking asylum based on their
sexual orientation ought to be on sound legal ground given the
twenty-year-old precedent for such claims. Why would eligible and
seemingly sympathetic individuals be denied legal relief?' The answer
lies in the asylum system's failure to keep up with evolving legal
norms. Asylum law was initially ahead of constitutional jurisprudence
in recognizing gay men as a persecuted minority in need of protection,
but it has failed to keep pace with evolving understandings of sexual
identity and the rights of LGBT young people. Instead, asylum
adjudicators evince outmoded thinking about sexuality, LGBT rights,
and young people.' Young LGBT asylum-seekers must also navigate an
asylum system that does not afford them procedural due process. o
This Article explores the difference between asylum law and
contemporary constitutional law regarding the rights of LGBT people,
elucidating the barriers confronting young LGBT asylum-seekers and
making proposals to improve the system of adjudication on their
behalf. Part I explains the application process for asylum based on
sexual orientation or gender identity, and how LGBT youth seeking
asylum are treated under that system. Part II describes the failure of
asylum adjudicators to recognize that young people who endure abuse
because of their behavior are victims of anti-gay persecution,
contradicting the emerging constitutional norm that discrimination
based on "homosexual conduct" is directed at LGBT "status." Part III
2007) (affirming the denial of asylum to a gay man who entered the country at age 17
after being abused by his family for his sexual orientation); Matter of _ ,
(B.I.A. 2004) (unpublished, on file with author) (affirming denial of asylum to young
gay man who had been sexually assaulted because of his sexual orientation).
7 Cf SUSAN SCHMIDT & JACQUELINE BHABHA, KAFKA'S KIDS: CHILDREN IN U.S.
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS PART 11: BEYOND AND BESIDES ASYLUM, IMMIGRATION
BRIEFINGs(2007) (noting the "paradoxical fact that unaccompanied and separated
children, a particularly vulnerable population who one would expect to be recipients
of more generous and compassionate attention, instead attract particularly harsh, even
punitive, responses.").
8 LGBT children are subject to at least two overlapping forms of oppression:
homophobia (or transphobia) and anti-child bias. Kimberle Crenshaw's theory of
intersectionality explains how racism and sexism combine to impose a unique
disadvantage on women of color, which can deprive them of equal access to relief
even when the intention is to facilitate access to a remedy. Similarly, the intersectional
subordination of LGBT young people frustrates their ability to win asylum. See
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244, 1248-49 (1991); see also
infra notes 184-191 and accompanying text.
' See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part IV.
3772011]
University of California, Davis
explores why credible testimony by LGBT youths in asylum
proceedings is not accepted as adequate proof of their sexual identity
and argues that asylum adjudicators treat the very notion of an LGBT
child as a paradox. Part IV explains how the current asylum system
denies young LGBT asylum-seekers due process. Part V makes
recommendations to improve the adjudication of asylum claims filed
by LGBT children and young adults.
1. THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM CLAIMS BY LGBT YOUTHS
Although LGBT people have succeeded in achieving a measure of
acceptance and safety in some communities, homophobic and anti-
transgender violence remains a fact of life in every country in the
world." LGBT people regularly face discrimination, harassment, rape,
torture, and even execution because of their sexual orientation or
gender identity." Not surprisingly, this pervasive hostility and fear has
prompted thousands of LGBT people to flee their countries of origin
in search of a safe haven abroad." Although the precise number is
unknown, many LGBT people seeking asylum in the United States are
children and young adults." Many of these young people have faced
" See generally Crimes of Hate, Conspiracy of Silence: Torture and Ill-treatment Based on
Sexual Identity, AMNESTY INT'L PUBLICATION (2001), http/www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/ACT40/016/2001/en/bb63ae8f-d961-1ldd-a057-592cb671dd8b/act400l6200len.pdf.
The U.S. is no exception; LGBT people regularly suffer violent assaults at the hands of
government officials and private parties in this country. See Stonewalled Police Abuse and
Misconduct Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the U.S. AMNESTY INT'L
PUBLICATION (2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/outfront/stonewalled/report.pdf- Michelle
A. Marzullo and Alyn J. Libman Hate Crimes and Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender People, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION PUBLICATION (2009),
httpi/www.hrc.org/documents/ResearchOverview HateCrimes.pdf. Remaining aware of
the homophobic and anti-transgender nature of American society is important in any
discussion of asylum for LGBT people to avoid "allow [ing] a judgment of 'barbarism' to be
fixed on the sending country, almost always Third World, and produc[ing] a sense of
moral superiority or complacency in the receiving country." Alice M. Miller, Seeking the
Grant of Asylum and Protecting Global Sexual Diversity, in PASSING LINES: SEXUALITY AND
IMMIGRATION 135, 166 (Brad Epps et al. eds., 2005).
12 See generally Crimes of Hate, Conspiracy of Silence: Torture and Ill-treatment Based on
Sexual Identity, AMNESTY INT'L PUBLICATION (2001), http//wwwamnesty.orglen/library/
asset/ACT40/016/2001/en/bb63ae8f-d961-1 ldd-a057-592cb671dd8b/act400l6200len.pdf.
13 Id. at 26.
" The number of LGBT youth who apply for political asylum each year is
unknown. The administrative bodies responsible for adjudicating asylum applications,
the Department of Homeland Security and the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice, do not keep statistics on the number
of asylum claims filed on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. See Krista
Gesaman, Desperately Seeking Freedom: Are the Number of Immigrants Seeking Asylum
378 [Vol. 45:373
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anti-gay violence from a young age, including rape, family rejection,
school exclusion, police detention, and physical abuse. They come to
the United States in search of a safe haven where they can live openly
and without fear of homophobic abuse."
To win asylum in the United States, applicants must demonstrate
that they meet the definition of a "refugee" under the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA").16 To do so, claimants must establish that they
have a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."" The first step in meeting this standard is to prove that any
mistreatment the applicant faces is on account of one of the protected
grounds described in the INA. For LGBT youth who fear persecution
based on their sexual orientation or gender identity, this means
showing that they belong to a "particular social group" that qualifies
under the Act.
A. Defining the Social Group at Issue
The INA does not define "particular social group;" therefore, the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") has defined the term. The BIA
first explained the characteristics of "particular social groups" in
Matter of Acosta.'8 Using the principle of ejusdem generis to determine
how the particular social group category related to the other four
grounds for asylum, the BIA reasoned that a "particular social group"
is "a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic."" The characteristic at issue must therefore be
something "the members of the group either cannot change, or should
not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
over Sexual Orientation Discrimination Increasing?, NEWSWEEK, November 30, 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/11/29/desperately-seeking-freedom.html. Indeed, the
EOIR does not even track the birth dates of respondents in immigration court, so
there is no accurate count of the number of asylum applications made by children
generally. See JACQUELINE BHABHA & SUSAN SCHMIDT, SEEKING ASYLUM ALONE:
UNACCOMPANIED AND SEPARATED CHILDREN AND REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES 15 (Univ. Committee on Human Rights Studies, Harvard Univ. ed., 2006),
available at www.humanrights.harvard.edu/images/pdf-files/Seeking-AsylumAlone
USReport.pdf.
15 See infra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
16 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)
(2011).
1 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2011).
" Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232-34 (B.I.A. 1985).
19 Id. at 233.
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identities or consciences."20 The BIA subsequently stated that a group
must have "social visibility" and adequate "particularity" to constitute
a protected social group."
The BIA first recognized a gay man as a member of a particular
social group in 1990, ruling in In Re Toboso-Alfonso that
"homosexuals" in Cuba constitute a particular social group.22 In 1994,
the Attorney General designated the Toboso-Alfonso decision as
"precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. "23
Since then, several courts of appeals similarly recognized
"homosexuals" as a particular social group." In 2005, the Ninth
Circuit unequivocally held that "all alien homosexuals are members of
a 'particular social group.' "2
In contrast, the BIA has not recognized children as a particular
social group under the INA.26 In denying asylum to an applicant who
claimed he had been singled out for persecution because he was a
child, the BIA noted that "the only defining characteristic [children
share] is age," and found that "all persons under the age of 18" could
not constitute a particular social group. The Third Circuit agreed,
20 Id. at 233.
21 In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 75-76 (BIA 2007). Three Courts of
Appeal have upheld the standard announced by the B.I.A., see Contreras-Martinez v.
Holder, 346 Fed. Appx. 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, U.S. LEXIS 3983
(2010); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 860-62 (9th Cir. 2009); Ucelo-Gomez
v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007). But the 7th 6th and 3rd Circuits have
rejected it. See Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 366-67 (6th Cir. 2010); Gatimi
v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009), Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
No. 08-4564, 2011 WL 5345436 (3rd Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). Some scholars argue that
the new "social visibility" and "particularity" requirements are inconsistent with
Acosta and amount to an entirely new and far more restrictive standard. See Fatma
Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defining a "Particular Social
Group" and its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and
Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 47, 63, 67 n.96 (2008). A full exploration of the
controversy around the B.I.A.'s new focus on "social visibility" and "particularity" is
beyond the scope of this article, but I will discuss its implications in the context of
asylum claims brought by bisexual youth, below.
22 Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (B.I.A. 1990).
23 Att'y Gen. Ord. No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
24 See, e.g., Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 721 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that
"homosexuals" constitute a social group); Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084,
1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that "gay men and lesbians in Cuba" constitute a particular social group).
25 Karouni v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).
26 See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 2003) (reviewing the BIA's
denial of asylum to a former child soldier and noting that the the B.I.A. "seemed to
question whether a group based on age may qualify as a 'particular social group.' ").
27 Id. at 166.
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opining that age plays a lesser role in personal identity because it
changes over time, "unlike innate characteristics, such as sex or
color." 28 The court also noted that "children as a class represent an
extremely large and diverse group ... [with] a wide degree of varying
experiences, interests, and traits." 9 Given that diversity, the court
ruled that children could not constitute a "particular social group" for
asylum purposes.0
The logic of this ruling is questionable. It is certainly true that every
person's age does change over time, but no one can alter their age of
their own volition. Acosta requires only that the trait uniting a
particular social group be immutable in that it is something that is
"beyond the power of an individual to change."3 ' A person who faces
persecution because she is a child cannot simply choose to be an adult
in order to avoid mistreatment. Her status as a child is "immutable"
under the Acosta analysis. It also defies common sense to claim that a
person's status as a child does not play a fundamental role in her
personal identity, given that being a child completely defines one's
legal rights and role in society. For their own protection, children are
forbidden from working, subject to mandatory school attendance laws,
obligated to live with their families, and treated as dependents rather
than full citizens.
21 Id. at 171. The Supreme Court relied on similar logic in concluding that age-
based discrimination is not subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that elderly people are not a discrete
and insular minority because old age "marks a stage that each of us will reach if we
live out our normal span." Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14
(1976).
2' Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171-72.
3o See id. at 173; see also Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2nd Cir. 1991)
(noting in dicta that "[1]ike the traits which distinguish the other four enumerated
categories - race, religion, nationality and political opinion - the attributes of a
particular social group must be recognizable and discrete. Possession of broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with
membership in a particular group.").
31 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34.
32 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 1 5-10 1577,
U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov. 20, 1989) ("Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child, 'the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity,
needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as
well as after birth.' ").
33 See, e.g., Minimum Age Convention, International Labor Organisation (No.
138) (June 17, 1973) (setting a minimum age for undertaking work that jeopardizes
health, safety, or morals of young people); Convention on Consent to Marriage Art. 2
(Nov. 7, 1962) (calling all State Parties to specify a minimum age for marriage);
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
2011] 381
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The fact that sexual orientation is recognized as a basis for asylum
under the INA, but childhood is not, influences the way LGBT youths
present their asylum claims. It creates a strong incentive for asylum-
seekers to focus on their sexual orientation and de-emphasize their age
in their asylum applications. Young LGBT asylum-seekers have
presented themselves simply as "homosexuals" and argued that they
have experienced or will face persecution on that basis. Indeed,
asylum rulings regarding LGBT children and young adults frequently
omit the applicant's age. Perhaps because of this de-emphasis on the
age of the applicant, the reported cases regarding LGBT young people
seldom indicate that the applicant received any special solicitude due
to his or her immaturity or vulnerability as a youth. Instead,
adjudicators have generally held applicants to an adult standard and
found no past persecution even when applicants endured serious
Children in armed conflict Art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000) (setting a
minimum age for voluntary recruitment into national armed forces).
3 See, e.g., Barrios-Aguilar v. Holder, No. 06-70010, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13674
(9th Cir. July 2, 2010) (remanding case of young man denied asylum by the IJ and
BIA who entered the U.S. at age 15 after being beaten, sexually assaulted and
threatened for being gay); De Paula v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 09-15960, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11239 (11th Cir. June 2 2010) (affirming denial of asylum because the
anti-gay harassment the applicant suffered as a child "does not meet the extreme
concept of persecution") (citations omitted); Todorovic v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 621
F.3d 1318, 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010) (remanding case of young gay man denied
asylum and withholding of removal by the IJ and BIA because the IJ determined that
he "bears no effeminate traits ... that would mark him as a homosexual"); Janem v.
Mukasey, 295 Fed. Appx. 89 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying petition for judicial review of
BIA order denying application of asylum for man claiming persecution because of his
homosexuality); Illescas-Dutan v. Mukasey, 271 F.App'x 109 (2d Cir. 2008)
(remanding case of young gay man who fled to the U.S. as a teenager and was denied
asylum by the 1J and BIA despite evidence of arrest and detention of gay individuals in
his home country); Liu v. Attorney Gen., 278 F.App'x 212 (3d Cir. 2008) (denying
asylum to gay man who had been beaten by his father and neighbors and expelled
from school because of his sexual orientation); Nabuwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115,
1118 (8th Cir. 2007) (remanding case of young lesbian woman denied asylum by the
IJ and BIA whose family arranged for her to be raped in a bid to change her sexual
orientation); Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2007) (remanding case of
22 year old gay man denied asylum by the IJ and BIA because his mannerisms did not
indicate that he was gay); Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651 (8th Cir.
2007) (affirming the denial of asylum to a gay man who entered the country at age 17
after being abused by his family for his sexual orientation); Kimumwe v. Gonzales,
431 F.3d 319, 323-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying petition for review for gay man and
finding that his expulsion from secondary school and arrest in college did not qualify
as persecution based on homosexuality); Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084,
1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding case of gay man who suffered past persecution and
had a well-founded fear of future persecution).
3 See cases cited supra note 34.
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mistreatment that would likely cause extreme distress in a child. In
fact, immigration judges have arguably held young applicants to a
higher standard than adults. As the examples below illustrate,
adjudicators are frequently unwilling to accept that young applicants
are in fact "homosexual,"3 6 even when the evidence creates no reason
to question their sexual orientation.
Omar Janem applied for asylum on the basis that he was gay and
faced persecution in his native country, Jordan, because of his sexual
orientation. The immigration judge ("IJ") noted that Janem had
"maintained in this proceeding that he is a homosexual," and
concluded that his statements were sincere.3 ' The INA allows Js to
grant asylum applications solely based on the applicant's testimony.
Nevertheless, the 1J faulted Janem for failing to produce testimony
from family members indicating he was gay. Janem testified that he
had never told his parents that he was gay because he was afraid they
would abuse or reject him if he did so. It was clear that Janem did not
have and could not "reasonably obtain" the corroborating evidence the
IJ sought." The IJ found that Janem's failure to produce statements
from his family members attesting to his sexuality was "not excusable"
and denied his asylum application.'
In another case, an asylum officer refused asylum to "Albion"4 1
because the applicant "could not convincingly show that [his] sexual
orientation is toward men."4 ' The applicant alleged he had suffered
anti-gay abuse in his native country, Albania, but the officer found
that "you could not give any explanation as to how anyone would
know that you [are] a homosexual except that you like men. You have
36 Courts typically refer to gay and transgender asylum seekers as "homosexual,"
despite the fact that the term is outmoded and pejorative (and, in the case of
transgender people, inapposite). See, e.g., Karouni v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172
(9th Cir. 2005) (referring to gay immigrants as "alien homosexuals."). I placed the
term in quotes because it is so antiquated and problematic.
" Brief and Required Short Appendix for Petitioner at 9, Janem v. Mukasey, 295
Fed. Appx. 89 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-3141), 2008 WL 1840927 at 9.
38 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)
(2011).
3 An applicant is required to produce corroborating evidence only if it is available
to him or if he can "reasonably obtain" it. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2011).
40 Brief and Required Short Appendix for Petitioner at 9, Janem v. Mukasey, 295
Fed. Appx. 89 (7th Cir. 2008) (No.07-3141), 2008 WL 1840927 at *9.
4 A pseudonym is used to refer to this young man, whose case was not publicly
reported.
42 Referral Notice from Patricia A. Jackson, Director, New York Asylum Office
(Mar. 8, 2007) (on file with author) (declining to grant asylum and referring the
applicant to immigration court for removal proceedings).
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not had a relationship with a man."13 Of course, many young people
have not yet had sexual relationships with anyone of either sex. Few
would argue that a young person must have a sexual relationship
before he can be sure that he is heterosexual, but Albion's asylum
officer was certain that Albion could not be gay without having had
sex with a man. 4
In a third case, even a documented history of same-sex sexual
activity and a statement from an adult guardian was insufficient to
prove that a young applicant was gay. William Kimumwe testified that
he was openly gay and submitted a letter from the director of his
orphanage attesting to his sexual orientation. 5 William produced
proof of his expulsion from school at the age of twelve for having sex
with another boy." He also submitted evidence that when he was
sixteen years old, he was arrested and served a two-month detention
without charge because he had sex with another male student at his
college.4 ' Despite this wealth of evidence, the U found that William
did not establish that he was gay because he had "presented no
objective evidence to confirm his homosexuality." 4
Proving membership in a particular social group is even more
challenging for young people who identify as transgender or bisexual.
Many people assume that these identities are mutable and alterable at
will." For example, Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel applied for asylum
at the age of sixteen,50 claiming he was a member of the social group of
4 Id. at 1.
Cf. Shira Maguen et al. Developmental Milestones and Disclosure of Sexual
Orientation Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youths, 23 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 219,
226-227 (2002) (noting that 81% of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth
became aware of their same-sex attraction at one age but did not have their first same-
sex contact until an older age).
5 Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319, 323-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).
46 Id. at 320-21.
4 Id. at 321.
48 Id.
49 See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 528 (1994) (noting that bisexuals
are assumed to be "capable of satisfactory sexual encounters with members of the so-
called 'opposite' sex" and thereby conforming to a heterosexual norm); Richard F.
Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent Jurisprudence of Transsexualism," 4
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 279-80 (1997) (describing how "juridical discourse seeks
to categorize transsexualism as play" and views the transsexual as deserving of social
censure because she disrupts the social order through "willful alteration of her body").
50 Hernandez-Montiel v. 1.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000).
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"gay men with female sexual identities" in Mexico." Geovanni
testified that he "realized that [he] was attracted to people of this]
same sex" at age eight and began "dressing and behaving as a woman"
at the age of twelve. 2 He also testified that he faced violent abuse in
his native Mexico, including death threats, expulsion from school,
being thrown out of his home, police detention and arrest, sexual
assault, rape, and a knife attack on account of his sexual orientation."
The IJ found Geovanni's testimony " 'credible,' 'sincere,' 'forthright,'
'rational,' and 'coherent.' "5 Despite the quality of his testimony, the IJ
found that Geovanni did not establish his membership in a particular
social group. The IJ characterized Geovanni's social group as
"homosexual males who wish to dress as a woman [sicl" and ruled
that it did not qualify as a particular social group under the Act." In
particular, the IJ found that Geovanni's gender identity was neither
immutable nor so fundamental to his identity that he should not be
required to change it. The BIA also ruled that Geovanni claimed "he
was mistreated because of the way he dressed (as a male prostitute)
and not because he is a homosexual," and that he had failed to show
that "his decision to dress as a female was an immutable
characteristic."5 6
Declaring that "[tihis case is about sexual identity, not fashion," the
Ninth Circuit overturned the BIA on appeal." The court concluded
that Geovanni's feminine dress reflected his sexual orientation: "[G lay
men with female sexual identities outwardly manifest their identities
through characteristics traditionally associated with women, such as
feminine dress, long hair and fingernails."" Further, the court held
that "[slexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable; they are
so fundamental to one's identity that a person should not be required
51 The opinion in Hernandez-Montiel's case appears to suggest that Hernandez-
Montiel identifies as female, stating that Geovanni "began dressing and behaving as a
woman" at the age of 12 and took female hormones. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at
1087, 1088. Nevertheless, the opinion uses male pronouns and a male name for
Hernandez-Montiel, noting that the court is referring to Petitioner "[als does
petitioner in his own briefs." Id. at 1087 n.1. For that reason, I also use the same male
name and male pronouns to refer to Hernandez-Montiel.
52 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087.
5 Id. at 1088.
5 Id. at 1089.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1089-90.
5 Id. at 1096.
58 Id. at 1094.
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to abandon them."" Geovanni was a member of "that group in Mexico
made up of gay men with female sexual identities," which constituted
a "particular social group" under the Act.60 The court also noted that
Geovanni identified as a transsexual, but declined to decide whether
"transsexuals" constituted a particular social group.61
The Hernandez-Montiel decision has drawn praise and criticism for
the way it characterized the social group at issue.62 Some
commentators argue that the case correctly allowed the asylum
applicant to describe his "particular social group" in a way that
reflected his personal experience and was specific to the cultural
context from which he came.63 In determining that "gay men with
female sexual identities" constituted a particular social group in
Mexico, the Ninth Circuit relied on expert testimony regarding the
social context for gay men in Latin America. The expert opined that
Mexican society did not regard men who took an "active" role in sex
with other men as "homosexuals." 64 Rather, he testified that only the
"passive" partner in sex between men was stigmatized as a
"homosexual" and singled out for violent mistreatment." Such "gay
men with female sexual identities" were said to reflect their identity
through feminine clothing and grooming.6 6 The court's reference to
the expert's testimony that masculine-appearing men who had sex
with men were not at risk for persecution has been criticized for
implying that masculine gay men are ineligible for asylum.
5 Id. at 1093.
60 Id. at 1091.
61 Id. at 1095 n.7.
62 See, e.g., Fadi Hanna, Case Comment, Punishing Masculinity in Gay Asylum
Cases, 114 YALE L.J. 913, 915 (2005) (criticizing Hernandez-Montiel for incorrectly
assuming that masculine gay men are less vulnerable to persecution); Joseph Landau,
"Soft Immutability" and "Imputed Gay Identity": Recent Developments in Transgender and
Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAA URB. L.J. 237, 251-52 (2005)
(praising Hernandez-Montiel for discussing the connection between identity and
behavior); Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge for
Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 31-32 (2003) (complimenting the
Ninth Circuit for recognizing that Hernandez-Montiel's "identity practice ... is worth
protecting, not because it cannot be changed, but because it is a meaningful and
worthy part of being that particular person").
61 See Sarah Hinger, Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Identity in Gender and Sexual
Orientation Based Asylum Claims, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 367,393-94 (2010).
' See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1089.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1094.
67 See Hanna, supra note 62, at 915-916 (suggesting that Hernandez-Montiel
requires asylum applicants to "reverse cover" or behave in accordance with
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Commentators point out that lesbians and gay men whose behavior or
appearance does not comport with judges' stereotypes about gay
people could be unfairly denied asylum under this logic.68
The more serious flaw in the decision, however, is that it conflates
sexual orientation and gender identity. The court effectively held that
people who are designated male at birth but identify as female and are
attracted to men are "gay men" as opposed to "(straight) women" or
"(straight) transgender women."69 Of course, the expert testimony in
the case indicated that such a description comported with Mexican
cultural norms and that people who were designated male at birth and
attracted to men were regarded as "gay men with female sexual
identities" in Mexico. 0 Whether Geovanni identified as a "gay man
with a female sexual identity" is difficult to ascertain. In the briefing,
the petitioner was referred to as an "effeminate gay man,"7 but the
court also noted that Geovanni had lived as a woman since the age of
twelve, took female hormones, and identified as "a transsexual."73 It,
therefore, seems likely that "gay man with a female sexual identity"
was a label affixed to Geovanni by others but not the one Geovanni
would have voluntarily chosen. Rather, Geovanni might well have
identified as female, despite being designated male at birth. If so, a
more appropriate description for Geovanni would be a transgender
woman and not a gay man.
stereotypes about gay people in order to win their asylum claims); see also Shahinaj v.
Gonzalez, 481 F.3d 1027, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007) (granting a petition for review filed by
a young gay man whose asylum claim was denied because, according to the 1J,
"Inleither [Shahinaj]'s dress, nor his mannerisms, nor his style of speech give any
indication that he is a homosexual").
" See Hanna, supra note 62, at 916.
69 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094, 1096 (describing Geovanni as part of a
group of gay men with female sexual identities. These men "outwardly manifest their
identities through characteristics traditionally associated with women, such as
feminine dress, long hair and fingernails").
70 Id. at 1089.
" Hemandez-Montiel's attorneys referred to him that way in their briefing, no
doubt doing so in part because "homosexuals" were already established as a particular
social group, while transgender people or transsexuals were not. See id. at 1087 n.1.
7' Brief of Amici Curiae, American Civ. Liberties Union of S. California et al. at 1,
Hernandez-Montiel v. 1.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-70582)
("Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel is an effeminate gay man.").
" See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087, 1088, 1095 n.7.
7 See generally Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731,733 n.12
(2008) (noting that " '[tlransgender' is a term that emerged in the 1990s to describe
people who experience discrimination or bias because they identify or express gender
differently than what is traditionally associated with the sex they were assigned at
birth.").
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Many people might wrongly assume that a transgender woman who
is attracted to men is gay, because they would see her as a man who is
sexually attracted to men. But she might actually identify as straight,
because she is a woman who is sexually attracted to men,
notwithstanding the fact that she was designated male at birth.
Transgender young people are particularly likely to have their
gender identity denigrated and ignored. Legal recognition of a
transgender person's true gender - the gender with which they
identify, as opposed to the gender designated at birth - is frequently
conditioned on the production of medical evidence, such as proof of
surgical intervention to "change" his or her sex." The focus on so-
called "sex change" surgeries is problematic for all transgender people,
but particularly for youth who are especially unlikely to have access to
those medical interventions. Surgical intervention is out of reach to
all but the most affluent transgender adults, and completely off-limits
to children.7 ' The international guidelines for doctors performing
transgender healthcare mandate that patients be at least eighteen
before undergoing sex reassignment surgery. Many doctors will not
even prescribe cross-gender hormones to a child without parental
consent."o Yet, the reality is that "[in almost every trans-related
71 See Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting, and
Representing LGBTQ Youth, 6 NEv. LJ. 774, 788-89, 801 (2006) (describing how "the
transgender girl may make us - even us lesbians and gay men - uncomfortable,
because we want to protect her from herself. Doesn't she know that kids will pick on
her for wearing dresses? And why does she think she is a girl?").
76 See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 15, 15-16 (2003) ("Everywhere that trans people appear in the law, a heavy
reliance on medical evidence to establish gender identity is noticeable.").
" Many transgender people do not have access to surgery or other medical
treatments, which can be prohibitively expensive and are often excluded from health
insurance or Medicaid coverage. Other transgender people do not want medical
intervention or feel that it is unnecessary for them to realize their true gender identity.
See Wylie C. Hembree et al., Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons: An Endocrine
Society Clinical Practice Guideline, 94J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3132,
3141 (2009).
71 See id. at 3143; WJ. Meyer III, et.al., 2001 Harry Benjamin International Gender
Dysphoria Association's The Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, 6th Version,
5 INT'LJ. TRANSGENDERISM 1, 11, 20 (2001).
79 See Meyer, supra note 78, at 11 (stating that for patients desiring sex
reassignment surgery, being 18 years of age or older "should be seen as an eligibility
criterion").
0 See Hembree, supra note 77, at 3139-43 (noting that "[olver the past decade,
clinicians have progressively acknowledged the suffering of young transsexual
adolescents that is caused by their pubertal development . . . [and so] various clinics
have decided to start treating young adolescents . . . with puberty-suppressing
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case . . . medical evidence will be the cornerstone of the determination
of hir" rights."82
A transgender youth applying for asylum in the wake of Hernandez-
Montiel has a difficult decision to make. She could define her social
group as "transgender people" and risk denial of her claim because no
precedential decision recognizes transgender people as a particular
social group under the INA." Alternatively, if she were designated
male at birth and is attracted to men, she could call herself a "gay man
with a female sexual identity," and thereby fall into a previously
recognized social group. The applicant might be able to avoid
deportation and persecution by making this representation on her
asylum application, but it means stifling her gender identity and
contributing to the erasure and invisibility of transgender people."
Similarly, no precedent establishes that bisexuals constitute a
particular social group eligible for asylum. The eligibility of
"homosexuals" for asylum is premised on the immutable and
personally fundamental nature of sexual orientation, which would
suggest that bisexuals also ought to constitute a particular social
group." However, many people assume bisexuals can simply choose
to have relationships with members of the opposite sex, and thus
medication."). The article recommends that "pubertal development of the desired,
opposite sex be initiated at the age of sixteen years, using a gradually increasing dose
schedule of cross-sex steroids," but notes that parental consent will be required except
in countries where 16-year-olds are considered legal adults. Id. at 3142.
81 Hir (pronounced "here") is a gender-neutral pronoun used to "resist the need to
categorize all subjects neatly into male and female categories." Spade, supra note 76, at
17 n.7.
82 Spade, supra note 76, at 17-18.
" See Landau, supra note 62, at 246 ("The B.I.A. has not formally recognized
transgender status as a particular social group and no federal circuit has yet squarely
considered the issue."); Victoria Neilson, Uncharted Territory: Choosing an Effective
Approach in Transgender-Based Asylum Claims, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265, 274 (2005)
("Unlike sexual orientation claims, there has yet to be a precedential decision
establishing transgender individuals as members of a particular social group.").
8 Cf. Muneer 1. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y &
L. 117, 120-22 (2002) (pointing out the ethical concerns for attorneys who advance
arguments that are advantageous to a client but "reinforce subordinating racist, sexist,
or homophobic stereotypes").
8 It is important to note that establishing membership in a particular social group
does not automatically entitle an applicant to asylum. She still has to demonstrate that
she has a well-founded fear of persecution on that basis. Immigration and Nationality
Act § 1101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2011). Whether or not a bisexual
person would be at risk of mistreatment goes to the latter issue which should not
affect qualification as a particular social group for asylum purposes.
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appear heterosexual.8 ' For this reason, bisexuals are thought to be less
visible than gay men, lesbians, or transgender people." Two recent
BIA cases make establishing bisexuals as a qualifying social group
more challenging because they emphasize the importance of "social
visibility" in determining whether a particular social group is
cognizable for asylum purposes. In C-A-, the BIA found that
"noncriminal drug informants working .against the Cali drug cartel"
did not constitute a particular social group because they were
insufficiently socially visible.8 In doing so, the BIA stressed that such
informants "intend [] to remain unknown and undiscovered," and
"visibility is limited to those informants who are discovered."89 The
BIA's analysis "suggests that under the 'social visibility' test, the group
members must be recognizable by the general public; it is not enough
for the group itself to be recognized."9 0 Similarly, in A-M-E-, the BIA
held that a particular social group must meet "the requirement that
the shared characteristic of the group . . . generally be recognizable by
others in the community.""
Establishing that bisexual people are "generally recognizable by
others in the community" is extremely challenging. Both gay and
straight people have a stake in suppressing the existence of bisexual
people in order to shore up the certainty of their own sexual
orientation. 9 2  Consequently, many people question whether
bisexuality really exists. Bisexual youths who fear persecution in their
native countries because of their sexual orientation are thus likely to
struggle in asserting asylum claims.
B. Establishing a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
Once an asylum applicant establishes that she is a member of a
particular social group cognizable under the Act, she must show that
she has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her
86 Halley, supra note 49 at 528 (noting that bisexuals are seen as capable of
relationships with members of the so-called 'opposite' sex and are therefore expected
to conform to the heterosexual norm).
"8 See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV.
353, 361 (2000).
1 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), affd, Castillo-Arias v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1115 (2007).
89 Id. at 960.
90 Marouf, supra note 21, at 64.
91 In re A-M-E & JG-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007), affd, Ucelo-Gomez
v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007).
9 Yoshino, supra note 87, at 362.
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protected characteristic.93 However, persecution is not defined in the
INA. The Ninth Circuit has defined the term as "the infliction of
suffering or harm upon those who differ . .. in a way regarded as
offensive."" The Eight Circuit has similarly defined persecution as
"the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or
freedom, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion."" What constitutes
persecution will depend on the circumstances of the individual
applicant; courts have noted that the general definition "must be
refined further in the context of a particular alien's situation."96
Private, as well as government actors, can inflict persecution; however,
the applicant must demonstrate that the private individuals are people
that "the government is unable or unwilling to control."9 7
If an applicant successfully demonstrates past persecution, then
there is a presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future
persecution." The burden then shifts to the government to show
either that circumstances have changed so as to negate that fear, or
that the applicant could reasonably relocate within her home country
so as to avoid persecution.99 An applicant who has not suffered
persecution in the past can still qualify for asylum by demonstrating a
"good reason to fear future persecution." To do so, the applicant must
"adduc[e] credible, direct, and specific evidence ... that would
support a reasonable fear of persecution."'00 The applicant's fear must
be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. 0'o Even a ten
percent chance of persecution has been deemed sufficient to meet the
requirement for an "objectively reasonable" well-founded fear.'02
9 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 1101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2011).
" Prasad v. 1.N.S., 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Desir v. lchert, 840
F.2d 723, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1988)).
9 Regalado-Garcia v. I.N.S., 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002).
96 Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 990 (8th Cir. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18608 (8th Cir. 2004).
9 Singh v. I.N.S., 134 F.3d 962, 967 n.9 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Sangha v. I.N.S.,
103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997)).
98 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1) (2011) ("An applicant who has been found to have
established . . . past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution on the basis of the original claim. That presumption may be
rebutted. . . .").
9 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1)(i) (2011); 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1)(ii)(2011).
100 Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Duarte De
Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)).
101 Id.
102 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
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Finally, an applicant who cannot demonstrate that she will be
personally singled out can establish a well-founded fear of persecution
by showing that there is a pattern or practice of persecution against a
group of which she is a member.
Children are subject to the same legal standard in applying for
asylum as are adults.1 o3 "[Tihe child applicant must establish that he
or she meets the definition of a refugee contained at Section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Regardless of how sympathetic the child's claim may be, he or she
cannot be granted asylum if this standard is not met."1o4 Thus, in order
to win asylum, a child must demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
However, the U.S. Government has taken the position that harm to a
child may qualify as persecution even when it would not rise to that
level for an adult."o' The Asylum Office Guidelines on Children's
Asylum Claims state, "[T] he harm a child fears or has suffered . . . may
be relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as
persecution."' 06 While the Asylum Office Guidelines suggest that
adjudicators will show heightened regard to harms suffered by
children, a review of reported cases involving violence inflicted on
LGBT children does not indicate that they are afforded such
solicitude. o
William Kimumwe was denied asylum although he had suffered
numerous harms because of his sexual orientation. He was expelled
from school at the age of twelve for having sex with a fellow student;
local authorities verbally abused him with anti-gay remarks and
chased him; neighbors spat on him, kicked him, and threw stones at
him; and "on one occasion, he was beaten by villagers and shocked
with an electrical wire" because he was gay. 08 At age sixteen, William
922, 925 (9th Cir. 2004).
103 SeeJEFF WEIS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, FILE No. 120/11.26,
GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN'S AsYLUM CLAIMS (1998), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/pressrelease/ChildrensGuidelinesl2lO98.pdf.
104 Id.,at 17-19; see also Cruz-Diaz v. U.S. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) ("In the absence of statutory intent to apply a different standard for a
juvenile, and in light of the reasonable interpretation by the INS that the standard as
stated takes into consideration the petitioner's age, we are not at liberty to substitute a
different interpretation.").
105 WEIS, supra note 103, at 19.
106 Id.
1'0 See supra Part L.A.
108 Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319, 322-23. The court determined that this
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was imprisoned for two months after having sex with a fellow sixteen-
year-old boy.'09 The Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of asylum,
concluding that "the government's action in this instance was based
not on Kimumwe's homosexual status, but on allegations of sexual
misconduct[.] ""0
Similarly, the U and the BIA found that Geovanni Hernandez-
Montiel had not suffered past persecution even though a police officer
sexually assaulted him, another officer raped him, and a group of
unknown assailants attacked him with a knife when he was only
fourteen years old."' The BIA found that "[his] mistreatment arose
from his conduct . . . thus the rape by the policemen, and the attack by
a mob of gay bashers are not necessarily persecution."" 2 The BIA
essentially found that fourteen-year-old Geovanni invited the
mistreatment because he was gay, female-identified, and wore
dresses."'
In Calle v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit held that a police
officer's rape of a sixteen-year-old boy was not persecution." 4 The
court instead equated the rape with an act of "[miere harassment."" 5
The Second Circuit similarly discounted a police officer's rape of a
seventeen-year-old boy in Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzalez."' The court
dismissed the rape as an "isolated act of random violence" that did not
qualify as past persecution." 7 But the police officer's rape of Joaquin-
Porras was not "random" because the perpetrator was motivated by
the victim's sexual orientation."' A violent act committed against
abuse did not constitute persecution because "[alctions by private parties are not
attributable to the government, absent a showing that . .. the government is unwilling
or unable to control [the abusers]." Id.
'09 Id. at 321.
110 Id. at 322.
" Hemandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000). Hernandez-
Montiel had also been forced into abusive psychotherapy intended to change his
gender identity and expelled from school. Moreover, he was thrown out of his home,
detained and strip-searched by the police on "numerous occasions," and arrested
twice without charge because the police said it was "illegal for homosexuals to walk
down the street and for men to dress like women." Id.
"2 Id. at 1098.
"13 Id.
"' Calle v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 264 F App'x. 882,884 (11th Cir. 2008).
11 Id. (quoting Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.
2005)).
116 Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2006).
117 Id. at 177. The court emphasized the fact that the applicant had suffered no
further harm in the seven years following the attack.
18 Joaquin-Porras testified that the police officer "asked him if he liked men"
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someone because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion is persecution, not
"random" violence. 119
While courts may say that "[w]hen a petitioner's claim for.relief
from removal is based on harms suffered while the petitioner was a
child, our definition of what constitutes persecution should be
reflective of children's unique vulnerability,"' no such solicitude is
present in these cases. The mistreatment that William Kimumwe and
Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel experienced would likely rise to the
level of persecution if inflicted upon adults. That the Js who heard
their cases did not view the mistreatment inflicted on these applicants
as persecution, given that it took place when they were minor
children, is striking. Geovanni was still a minor when he filed his
asylum application. 2' Even when confronted with a child whose
testimony they deemed credible, the IJ and the BIA did not evaluate
the harm Geovanni endured according to a child-specific standard.
Rather than granting him special solicitude, the IJ and BIA dismissed
the harm Geovanni suffered and refused to recognize the abuse both
state and private actors inflicted on him because of his gender identity
as persecution.
II. How ASYLUM ADJUDICATORS PERPETUATE AN OUTMODED
STATUS/CONDUCT DISTINCTION IN EVALUATING LGBT YOUTHS' ASYLUM
CLAIMS
Asylum adjudicators continue to deny young LGBT people's asylum
claims on the basis that the mistreatment they suffered was not
because of their LGBT status but because of willful conduct in which
they voluntarily engaged. An IJ denied William Kimumwe's
application for asylum because he determined the abuse he
experienced was "not based on [his] sexual orientation but rather on
before the attack, which was clearly a reference to his sexual orientation. Id. at 175.
u' Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that
"[wihether particular conduct constitutes persecution or 'random' violence turns on
the perpetrator's motive. If the perpetrator is motivated by his victim's protected
status--including sexual orientation--he is engaging in persecution, not random
violence") (citation omitted).
120 Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2004) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121 Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000).
Kimumwe, Joaquin-Porras, and Calle were over eighteen by the time they filed their
asylum applications. See Calle v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 264 Fed. Appx. 883 (11th Cir. 2008);
Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2006); Kimumwe v. Gonzales,
431 F.3d 319, 320 ( 8th Cir. 2005).
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[his] involvement in prohibited sexual conduct."1 22 Similarly, an IJ and
the BIA denied Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel's asylum claim because
they found that "[his] mistreatment arose from his conduct . . . thus
the rape by the policemen, and the attack by a mob of gay bashers are
not necessarily persecution."' 23 The "conduct" that precipitated his
abuse was that he wore female clothing, which the BIA characterized
as "dress[ing] as a male prostitute."l 24
Both decisions imply that the children could have avoided
persecution based on their sexual orientation or gender identity by
refraining from expressing their identities. In Kimumwe, the court
found that William was mistreated not because he was gay, but
because he had sex with another boy at his school.25 Similarly, the IJ
and BIA concluded that Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel was singled out
because he wore clothing not traditionally associated with the sex he
was designated at birth, rather than because of his sexual identity."'
The courts suggest that harm the young people suffered was not on
account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, but because of
their behavior. This supposed distinction between LGBT "status" and
"conduct" has been and continues to be assailed in the constitutional
jurisprudence on LGBT rights. 1 2  In clinging to this distinction,
asylum law has failed to keep pace with the evolving conception of
LGBT rights in the constitutional context.
The constitutional jurisprudence on the rights of sexual minorities
to be free from discrimination based on their sexual orientation and
gender identity has evolved significantly over the past twenty years. In
1996, the Supreme Court overturned a voter-enacted amendment to
the Colorado Constitution that forbade the enactment of statutes
outlawing anti-gay discrimination. 28 Finding that the amendment had
been enacted with "the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened
by the law," 2 9 the Court held that animus toward gay people does not
constitute even a rational basis for the enactment of legislation.
Colorado could not, therefore, "classif[y] homosexuals ... [solely to]
make them unequal to everyone else."o In 2003, the Supreme Court
122 Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 322.
123 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1098.
124 Id. at 1095.
12 Kimurwe, 431 F.3d at 322.
126 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1098.
127 See infra notes 128-160 and accompanying text.
8 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
129 Id. at 633-35.
130 Id. at 635.
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concluded that state laws criminalizing sodomy are unconstitutional,
reversing itself less than twenty years after upholding the validity of
those statutes.' The Court found that the privacy protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause encompass a right to
engage in gay sex. Under Lawrence v. Texas, adults "may choose to
enter upon (a same-sex sexual] relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons."'
Relying on Lawrence, lower courts held that the Don't Ask Don't
Tell Act ("DADT"), which allowed "homosexuals" to serve in the
military so long as they did not engage in any "homosexual conduct",
violated service members' Fifth Amendment rights." DADT officially
allowed lesbian, gay, and bisexual ("LGB") people to serve in the
armed forces, but mandated the discharge of any service member who
engaged in "a homosexual act," "stated that he or she is a homosexual
or bisexual, or words to that effect," or "married or attempted to marry
a person known to be of the same biological sex."134 Transgender
people face military exclusion on medical grounds; even the repeal of
DADT will not allow transgender people to serve openly.'3 5 DADT was
supposed to represent an advance from an earlier military policy that
simply excluded gay people from military service.'36 It purported to
13 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that Bowers v. Hardwick,
which upheld the constitutionality of sodomy laws in 1986 "ought not to remain
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled").
132 Id. at 567.
133 See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. CV 04-08425-VAP (Ex), 2010
WL 3526272, at *36 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010); Witt v. Dep't of Air Force, 739 F.
Supp. 2d 1308, 1313 (W. D. Wash., 2010). See Lisa Leff, Transgender Veterans Seek
Recognition, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2011, http://www.boston.cominews/nation/
articles/20 11/0 1/30/transgender.veterans seek recognition.
3 10 U.S.C.S. § 654(b) (2011) (repealed by Don't Ask Don't Tell Repeal Act of
2010, Pub L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010). DADT was officially repealed on
September 20, 2011, 60 days after the President, Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff certified to the congressional defense committees that implementing the
policies and regulations necessary to repeal DADT was consistent with the standards
of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and
retention. See Elisabeth Bumiller, A Final Phase for Ending Don't Ask Don't Tell, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2011 at A13; Thom Shanker, Pentagon Leaders Commend End of 'Don't
Ask' Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/us/
pentagon-leaders-commend-end-of-dont-ask-policy.html?_r=1&ref=dontaskdonttell.
135 See Leff, supra note 133.
"I See JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY
PoLicY 1 (1999); Gays in the Military: Sensible Compromise?, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1993,
at B6 (characterizing the "don't ask, don't tell" policy as an opportunity for "real
progress" for gays in the military).
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make LGB people eligible for service in the armed forces, but did so
based on an incredibly narrow vision of what it means to be LGB;
namely, DADT assumed that one can be lesbian, gay, or bisexual
without ever saying what one is, even privately, in confidential
correspondence. 3 1 Similarly, to construe DADT as a policy that
allowed LGB people to serve in the military requires accepting the
proposition that one can still be LGB if one is never allowed to commit
a "homosexual act," which would mean remaining completely celibate
and avoiding any sexual or romantic involvement with a person of the
same sex.
DADT purported to be a passing regime; that is, it claimed to
demand simply that LGB people hide their identity in order to serve.
But one might question whether the statute actually demanded
conversion: a service member risked discharge under the policy for
saying anything, even privately, that might indicate she was a lesbian;
she could not have sex with another woman even hundreds of miles
away from her base or publicly commit to a female partner."' If the
service member complied with those requirements, she would not just
hide her lesbian identity, she would abandon it."'
Not surprisingly, courts questioned the logic of DADT. Noting that
Lawrence guaranteed a substantive due process right "to engage in
adult consensual sexual acts,"o40 the Ninth Circuit found that DADT
intruded "upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a
manner that implicates the rights identified in Lawrence," and is
subject to heightened scrutiny.'"' For DADT to pass constitutional
muster, the court held that "the government must advance an
important government interest, the intrusion must significantly
further that interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further
"' Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 923 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (noting that the Act denies LGBT people in the military "the right to speak
about their loved ones while serving their country in uniform; it punishes them with
discharge for writing a personal letter, in a foreign language, to a person of the same
sex with whom they shared an intimate relationship before entering military service; it
discharges them for including information in a personal communication from which
an unauthorized reader might discern their homosexuality").
"s See Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d. 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008), reh'g
denied, 548 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2008).
"' See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J., 769, 833-34 (2002) (noting that
"acts of coming out can be sufficiently performative that one cannot burden acts of
self-identification without simultaneously burdening the underlying status. The
underlying identity does not exist inertly beneath the speech that describes it, but is
partially fashioned by that speech.").
140 Witt, 527 F.3d. at 813.
14' Id. at 819.
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that interest." 42 In the case of Margaret Witt, who brought an as-
applied challenge to DADT, the court found that her discharge would
be unconstitutional unless it significantly furthered the government's
important interest in military readiness or unit cohesion and the
interest could not be achieved through less intrusive means.'4 3 On
remand, the district court found the government had failed to provide
such a justification for Witt's discharge and ordered her
reinstatement. 1"
Similarly, in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, a district court
ruled that LGBT people have a substantive due process right under the
Fifth Amendment to "enjoy 'intimate conduct' in their personal
relationships . . . [and] to speak about their loved ones," 145 both of
which were violated by DADT. The Act prevented LGBT service
members from "discussing their personal lives" or complaining about
homophobic harassment and hazing, thus violating the First
Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and petition. 6 The
court found DADT facially unconstitutional and ruled that the
plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction barring its
enforcement. 4 1
The logic of Lawrence extends not just to LGBT adults, but to
teenagers as well. In State v. Limon, the Supreme Court of Kansas
found "the demeaning and stigmatizing effect [of anti-gay criminal
laws] upon which the Lawrence Court focused is at least equally
applicable to teenagers . . . and, according to some, the impact is
greater on a teen.""' The court also noted that under Lawrence and
Romer, "moral disapproval of [LGBT people] cannot be a legitimate
government interest."' 4 9 On that basis, the court invalidated a
provision of the state's "Romeo and Juliet" law that provided reduced
criminal penalties for violations of the state's statutory rape law
involving voluntary sex between teenagers of the opposite sex who
were less than four years apart in age. Matthew Limon was an
eighteen-year-old young man with a cognitive disability who lived in a
142 Id.
.43 Id. at 821. The Court then remanded Margaret Witt's claim back to the district
court for a ruling on her as-applied challenge to DADT.
'4 Witt v. Dep't of Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (W.D. Wash., 2010).
145 Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 923 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
146 Id. at 927.
147 Id. at 929, (stay granted, Log Cabin Republicans v. U.S., No. 10-56634, 2010
WL 4136210 (9th Cir 2010).
148 State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 29 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam).
"' Id. at 35.
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home for developmentally disabled teenagers. He was arrested after
engaging in voluntary oral sex with a fourteen-year-old fellow resident
of the facility. Limon did not qualify for relief under the Romeo and
Juliet statute because his sexual partner was male. He received a
seventeen-year, two-month prison sentence for criminal sodomy.'15
The Kansas Court of Appeals upheld Limon's conviction because it
found that he suffered no discrimination based on his sexual
orientation.'5 The court found that Limon's punishment was for his
"conduct of engaging in sodomy with a child."15' The lower court also
held that excluding gay teenagers from the Romeo and Juliet law was
justified since "homosexual sodomy between children and young
adults could disturb the traditional sexual development of children."'
The lower court also found that the law was "rationally related to the
purpose of protecting and preserving the traditional sexual mores of
society and the historical sexual development of children."'
The Kansas Supreme Court squarely rejected this "teenage
development exception" to Lawrence and Romer, pointing out that
neither the lower court nor the State cited "any scientific research or
other evidence justifying the position that homosexual sexual activity
is more harmful to minors than adults."'55 The court also noted that a
number of studies indicate that "sexual orientation is already settled
by the time a child turns 14, that sexual orientation is not affected by
the sexual experiences teenagers have, and that efforts to pressure
150 Limon was also subject to 60 months of post release supervision and was
required to register as a persistent sexual offender. He had two prior juvenile
adjudications for aggravated criminal sodomy. Even accounting for his prior juvenile
record, however, had he qualified for downward departure under the Romeo and
Juliet statute, Limon would have faced a maximum of 15 months of incarceration. Id.
at 25.
15 The Kansas Court of Appeals had upheld Limon's conviction twice. Limon
appealed after he was convicted; the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed and the state
Supreme Court denied his petition for review. State v. Limon, No. 85,898, 2002 Kan.
App. LEXIS 104, at *1(Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2002), rev. denied, 274 Kan. 1116 (2002).
Limon appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated his conviction
and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for a decision consistent with the
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, (2003). Limon v. Kansas, 539
U.S. 955 (2003). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed Limon's conviction.
State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (2004), rev'd 122 P.3d 22 (2005). Limon appealed to the
Kansas Supreme Court, which reversed the Court of Appeals. State v. Limon, 122 P.3d
22, 37-42 (Kan. 2005).
152 State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 239 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 122 P.3d 22, 29
(Kan. 2005) (per curiam).
1 Id. at 236.
1 Id. at 236-37.
1 Limon, 122 P.3d at 35.
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teens into changing their sexual orientation are not effective."1 6 As
such, the statute at issue did not advance the state's alleged interest in
encouraging teenagers to follow the "traditional sexual development of
children" and to be heterosexual. Finally, the alleged state interest was
not valid under Lawrence because "moral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate government interest."15 7 Concluding that the
provision restricting the Romeo and Juliet law's coverage to teenagers
who had sex with members of the opposite sex violated the guarantee
of equal protection under the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions, the court
struck it from the statute. 5 1
The U.S. Supreme Court also recently stated that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation encompasses not just discrimination on
the basis of LGBT "status," but also discrimination on the basis of
LGBT "conduct" such as same-sex sexual activity. 5 9 In rejecting a
group's contention that it did not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation when it refused to admit people who engage in what the
group called "unrepentant homosexual conduct," the Court noted that
its "decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct
in this context."160
In evaluating LGBT people's claims for protection from anti-gay
discrimination under the constitution, courts have increasingly
rejected the notion that LGBT people can be penalized for expressing
their sexual orientation through certain conduct, such as having same-
sex sexual relationships or openly stating their sexual identity. To
hold that an asylum-seeker jailed for having gay sex was not
persecuted on the basis of his sexual orientation is to cling to an
outmoded understanding of sexual identity. The rape and knife attack
of a transgender person is also no less persecution because the victim
expressed his gender identity by wearing dresses. In the constitutional
context, courts accept that engaging in gay sex or otherwise
expressing one's sexual identity is a vital part of being LGBT and that
to forbid such expression is to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity.16' Asylum adjudicators will remain
behind the curve if they persist in the belief that attacks on young
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 40.
Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971,
2990 (2010).
160 Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)).
161 See supra notes 128-160 and accompanying text.
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LGBT people for their sexual expression do not constitute persecution
on the basis of their sexual orientation. 62
Ill. THE CONFOUNDING NATURE OF YOUTH AND SEXUAL IDENTITY AND
WHY "LGBT YOUTH" Is TREATED AS A PARADOX
In a landmark decision for children's rights, Graham v. Florida, the
Supreme Court recently held that a young person under the age of
eighteen could not be sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense.' 63 Graham followed a
2005 decision, Roper v. Simmons, in which the Court ruled that minors
could not receive the death penalty, even for a premeditated murder
conviction.' 4 In ruling that the sentences at issue in both cases were
cruel and unusual punishment when applied to children, the Court
found that "[a]s compared to adults, juveniles have a 'lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility'; they 'are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure'; and their characters are 'not as well
formed.' "165 The Court held that children deserve special solicitude,
even when they commit heinous crimes. The Court based this
conclusion in part upon "developments in psychology and brain
science" that "show fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds." 66
162 See Maldonado v. U.S. Att'y Gen. 188 Fed. Appx. 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2006)
(stating that while "the government alleges that the persecution was not 'on account'
of [the applicant's sexual orientationi . . . but occurred instead because he engaged in
an activity (leaving gay discos late at night) that he was free to modify. This is a
distinction without a difference. The fact that Maldonado was targeted by the police
only while engaged in an elective activity does not foreclose the possibility that he was
persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group"); Karouni v.
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an asylum seeker could
not be required to remain celibate in order to avoid persecution because there is "no
appreciable difference between an individual . . . being persecuted for being a
homosexual and being persecuted for engaging in homosexual acts"). Note the
distinction between the approach in these two cases, both involving adults, and
Kimumwe v. Gonzalez, 431 F.3d 319, 320 (8th Cir., 2005) (holding that a 16-year-old
gay boy's incarceration for having sex with another boy was not persecution but
punishment for engaging in prohibited conduct) (citation omitted).
163 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Mark Hansen, What's the
Matter With Kids Today, 96 A.B.AJ. 50, 51 (2010) (claiming that Graham "may be
comparable to the Brown v. Board of Education case in juvenile justice").
164 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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It is important to note that the science the Court relied on in Roper
and Graham does not cast doubt on whether children can reliably
identify themselves as LGBT. The psychological literature at issue
related to adolescents' impulsivity and tendency to act without
considering the consequences of their actions.'17 The Court found that
because the areas of the brain associated with behavior continue to
develop throughout adolescence, "[iit is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."'6 8
Simply put, an adolescent might have committed a heinous crime
because he acted without thinking, not because he is utterly evil and
depraved.'69 While children are not mature enough to resist acting
impulsively, the scientific literature suggests adolescents are capable of
forming a sincere sexual identity that is stable over time. Indeed, a
number of studies indicate that by the time a child turns 14, her
sexual orientation is already settled and will not change depending on
the sexual experiences she has or whether she is pressured to change
her sexual orientation. 70
The Court's decisions in Roper and Graham are particularly
groundbreaking because they diverge from a longstanding trend in
state law in choosing to treat children differently from adults based on
scientific information about children's mental capacity. Most states
have moved away from treating children accused of certain kinds of
criminal activity differently from adults.' These states conclude that
young people accused of certain crimes are no longer "children." 72
Such youth are, therefore, processed, tried, and sentenced in criminal
167 Id.
168 Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
169 Id.
170 State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 29 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam).
171 KAREEM L. JORDAN, VIOLENT YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: THE DECERTIFICATION OF
TRANSFERRED OFFENDERS 20 (2006) (stating that between the mid 1980s and the mid
1990s "all but six states either expanded or implemented laws that sought to increase
the number of juvenile offenders waived to adult criminal court."); see Julian V.
Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 495, 521 (2004) (noting
that "between the years 1992 and 2000, almost half the states took steps to facilitate
the transfer of juveniles accused to criminal court.").
172 George Butler & Royce R. Till, After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping Kids Out of Adult
Criminal Court, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1151, 1178 (2005) (noting that state statutes that
exclude children accused of enumerated crimes from juvenile court jurisdiction
"effectively create [] an irrebuttable presumption that children of a certain age who are
charged with certain crimes are not really children").
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cases in the same way an adult would be."7 Roper and Graham,
however, rejected this behavior-based conception of childhood,
holding that a person under eighteen is still entitled to special
solicitude even if the minor has committed adult-like acts.
Roper and Graham are also notable because they hold that children
are categorically ineligible for the death penalty following a
premeditated murder conviction and life without the possibility of
parole for crimes other than intentional murder."' After these rulings,
a defendant's youth is not just a mitigating factor that must be
considered by a jury; he is per se ineligible for these penalties because
of his age.' 5 In Roper, the Court entertained the possibility that there
may be some minor children convicted of murder who are sufficiently
mature (and sufficiently depraved) to warrant the imposition of the
death penalty.'7 6 Nevertheless, the Court held that no child could be
sentenced to death, notwithstanding the fact that there may be some
children who deserve such a punishment. In effect, the Supreme Court
held that juries cannot be trusted to properly weigh a child defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty."'7 Despite the fact that being a child
should render a defendant less culpable and more deserving of mercy,
the Court indicated that juries might actually feel more vengeful
towards a defendant because he is a minor.7 7 The Court suggested
that, while we think children should be treated better than adults, we
might actually treat children worse."'
" Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have legislative waiver statutes
that categorically exclude certain juveniles or offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction. Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2443 (1996). Ten states empower prosecutors
to choose the forum in which to try juvenile offenders when both the juvenile and
criminal courts have jurisdiction over a juvenile suspect by virtue of her age and the
nature of her alleged crime. Id. at 2439. Forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia use a judicial waiver procedure to transfer juveniles to criminal district
court for prosecution as an adult. Id. at 2436.
"7 Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
175 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
176 Id. at 572 ("Certainly it can be argued, although we by no means concede the
point, that a rare case might arise in which a juvenile offender has sufficient
psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to
merit a sentence of death.").
1' Id. at 572-73.
17 See id. (noting that "a defendant's youth may even be counted against him").
" Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age
Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REv. 51, 53 (2006); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham
v. Florida: Justice Kennedy's Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. OF
CONSTITUTIONAL L. & PUBLIC POLICY 66, 73 (2010).
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While in certain situations children may be viewed as vulnerable
members of society deserving of sympathy, there is a parallel view of
adolescents as threatening, socially disruptive individuals who are
irresponsible, unreliable and "out of control."' Under this view,
rather than sympathizing with society instead perceives them as
conniving, drains on resources who must be treated harshly lest they
take advantage of the system."" This might be called the "predatory
teenager" conception of children. It is presumably this notion of
childhood that leads the Supreme Court to distrust the ability of a jury
to fairly evaluate a child defendant's eligibility for the death penalty.
Rather than looking at a child defendant with sympathy because he is
a minor, the Court worries that a jury will see a "predatory teenager"
and view him as more deserving of the ultimate penalty than an adult
convicted of the same crime. In holding that all minors must be
exempt from the harshest punishments, the Court rejects the
predatory teenager stereotype, finding instead that all children are
worthy of special solicitude.
Unfortunately, asylum adjudicators evaluating young LGBT asylum
applicants' claims have not accepted the Court's sympathetic view of
young people. The asylum system's failure to absorb the lessons of
10 See Robin Templeton, Superscapegoating: Teen 'Superpredators' Hype Set Stage for
Draconian Legislation, FAIRNESS & AccuRAcY IN REPORTING (January/February 1998),
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1414 (explaining that more than two-thirds of
local news stories on violence concerned young people under age 25 even though 57%
of violent crime is committed by people age 25 and over, and more than half of local
news stories on youth involved violence); Jerome Miller, Riding the Crime Wave,
NIEMAN REPORTS (Winter 1998), http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/
102294/Riding-the-Crime-Wave.aspx (noting that "[f1rom Plato to William Golding,
the young always seem to be vested with a potential for dissolution and violence");
One extreme example of this viewpoint is the notion of the "superpredator"
popularized by John J. Dilulio, Jr. in the mid-1990s. Dilulio warned that a new, more
dangerous type of youthful offender was emerging who would commit much more
serious violent crime than teenagers in the past. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of
the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23 ("On the horizon ... are
tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile super-predators ... They
fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment."). His ideas were
widely reported in the popular press and spawned federal and state legislation
increasing the penalties for juvenile crime, even though offense rates for homicide and
serious crime generally were dropping for youth offenders. See Linda S. Beres &
Thomas D. Griffith, The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal Justice System, 34 Lov.
L.A. L. REV. 747, 753-56 (2001).
18 See Beres & Griffith, supra note 180, at 747 ("Youth in general, and young
minority males in particular, often are demonized by legislators, the media, scholars,
and the public at large.").
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Roper and Graham causes its decisions to further diverge from
contemporary constitutional norms.
A. The Confounding Burden Facing Young LGBT Asylum Applicants
A number of forms of subordination burden young LGBT asylum-
seekers and limit their ability to be heard in immigration proceedings.
Heterosexism and stereotypes about children shape adjudicators' views
of LGBT youths' claims.'82 This suggests young LGBT people will be
less able than LGBT adults or heterosexual children to obtain asylum,
even when they legitimately qualify for relief. Adjudicators who fail to
attend to the interacting forms of oppression young LGBT asylum-
seekers confront may deprive these youth of equal access to relief from
persecution even when their intention is to facilitate access to relief for
deserving applicants.' "Intersectional subordination need not be
intentionally produced; in fact, it is frequently the consequence of the
imposition of one burden with preexisting vulnerabilities to create yet
another dimension of disempowerment.""a An exploration of the
specific burdens confronting young LGBT asylum-seekers is necessary
to discover how adjudicators may inadvertently exclude them from
protection.
A strain of feminist and critical race theory called intersectionality
initially recognized how different forms of subordination interact to
produce particular harm to women of color."8 ' Kimberle Crenshaw
notes that "the narratives of gender are based on the experience of
white, middle-class women, and the narratives of race are based on the
experiences of Black men."l86 Thus, an anti-racist analysis capturing
only the situation of men of color, and a feminist analysis accounting
only for experiences of white women, would not reflect the reality for
women of color.
Race and sexuality scholars expanded this theory to note that many
communities experience multidimensional subordination, confronting
not just sexism and racism, but also heterosexism and a lack of class
privilege.'"' Thus, it is important to look at the ways different forms of
oppression interact with and reinforce one another. For example,
182 See infra Part Ill.
183 See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1249.
184 Id.
1I Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1366 (2000).
18 See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1298.
s Hutchinson, Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, supra note
185, at 1366 (2000).
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rather than asking how white, upper class gay men are "like" people of
color, which ignores the fact that many LGBT people are also low-
income people of color, race and sexuality scholarship teaches that the
pertinent inquiry should address how heterosexism and racism are
intertwined. "
In the case of young LGBT asylum-seekers, it is clear that anti-child
bias in the form of the predatory teenager stereotype and anti-gay bias
reinforce one another to undermine the adjudication of their claims.
However, the nature of the overlapping forms of subordination these
youth shoulder is distinct from the intersectional or multidimensional
oppression discussed above.'18  Rather than intersectional or
multidimensional, heterosexism and anti-child bias are confounding
forms of oppression. That is to say "LGBT child" is a contradiction in
terms. Heterosexist notions of sexuality and anti-child biases combine
such that being a child appears to be incompatible with being LGBT. A
person who claims to be an LGBT child encounters not only anti-child
and homophobic bias, but, at a basic level, incredulity because an
"LGBT child" cannot exist. 90 A child cannot be LGBT, and a person
who is LGBT cannot be a child."' As Teemu Ruskola points out, "our
popular, medical, and legal understandings of homosexuality . .. are
premised on a central cultural fantasy that gay and lesbian youth do
not exist." 9 2
1. Childhood as Performance
The law frequently treats "child" as a performative category, holding
that children who commit certain acts are no longer "children"
deserving of any special solicitude and should instead be treated as
adults.'19 A child accused of a serious crime will, in most states, be
charged as an adult, be tried in adult criminal proceedings, and be
'8 Id. (arguing that heterosexism supports and perpetuates racism).
'19 See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1249 (discussing intersectional oppression);
Hutchinson, Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, supra note 185, at
1366 (discussing multidimensional oppression).
190 Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the Fantasy That Gay
and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALEJ. L. & FEMINISM 269, 269-70 (1996).
191 Cf. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 373 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 122 P.3d 22
(Kan. 2005) (stating that "children are excluded from the class that 'may legally
engage in private consensual sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle,' and
all persons who 'may legally engage in private consensual sexual practices common to
a homosexual lifestyle' are excluded from the class of children").
192 See Ruskola, supra note 190, at 269-70.
193 See supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
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eligible for the same penalty an adult would receive for the crime. 94
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that a young person convicted
of a heinous crime ceases to be a child worthy of special solicitude in
holding that the death penalty and life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole were cruel and unusual punishment when applied
to children."' But, the fact remains that in almost every state, a
sixteen-year-old accused of murder will be prosecuted as an adult and
sentenced to decades in prison if convicted."' Such a child is simply
deemed to be an adult because of his acts, since a "child" would never
commit such a crime.
Similarly, "children" are expected to refrain from sexual activities.
While the specific age of consent varies, every state in the U.S.
requires children to be at least twelve before they can legally consent
to sex, with the most common age of consent being sixteen.197 An
adult who engages in sexual contact with a child under the age of
consent faces criminal prosecution for statutory rape.'98 The alleged
willingness of a child under the age of consent to engage in sex is not
an affirmative defense to a statutory rape charge.' The law deems
children under the minimum age incapable of consent.200 There are
certain children, however, whose sexual contact with adults the law
deems both consensual and culpable. For example, children who are
accused of prostitution are subject to prosecution under the
" Cf Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2025 (2010) ("Many States have chosen
to move away from juvenile court systems and to allow juveniles to be transferred to,
or charged directly in, adult court under certain circumstances. Once in adult court, a
juvenile offender may receive the same sentence as would be given to an adult
offender, including a life without parole sentence.").
115 Id. at 2030; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
' Only Missouri and Nebraska lack statutes permitting the transfer of children
from juvenile court to adult court in cases where the child is accused of murder.
' See Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the
Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 314 (2003);
RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 48
(1996).
198 In some states, a peer who has sex with a fellow teenager also faces prosecution.
1" See, e.g., Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1088 (Fla. 1994), reh'g denied, (Kogan,
J., concurring) (concurring with the majority's upholding of the conviction of a 19-
year-old man for having sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend despite evidence of the
girlfriend's consent and stating that "an uncritical acceptance of the notion of youths
'consenting' to sexual activity will merely create a convenient smoke screen for a
predatory exploitation of children and young adolescents").
200 See e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.05 (Consol. 2011) (stating that "it is an element
of every offense defined in this article that the sexual act was committed without
consent of the victim" but " [a] person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she
is . . . less than seventeen years old . . . .").
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delinquency statutes and confinement in a secure institution if the
charge is sustained."0o A child's statutory lack of ability to consent to
sex is no defense in such a delinquency prosecution.202 In effect, the
law treats sex with children as rape unless someone is paying for it, in
which case the child is deemed a consenting, culpable party. 203
Advocates for sexually exploited youth decry this practice, arguing
that adult procurers coerce children into the sex trade and then profit
from their victimization.204 Their activism has produced legislative
efforts to reform the delinquency statutes, but in most jurisdictions,
the law continues to treat children accused of commercial sexual
activity differently than other children.2 ' A child who has sex for
201 See, e.g., In re B.D.S.D., 289 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. App. 2009), reh'g denied, No. 09-
0659, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 391 (2010) (affirming trial court's finding that juvenile
appellant engaged in prostitution and noting that, in Texas, the statutory definition of
"prostitution" is not limited to adult conduct); In re Emani G., No. D-7650/05, slip op.
at 3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005) (denying appellant's motion to dismiss her juvenile
delinquency proceeding for prostitution); In re Cheri T., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999), petition for rev. denied, No. S078514, 1999 Cal. LEXIS 4534 (1999)
(affirming juvenile court's order sustaining a petition charging appellant with
prostitution); In re Appeal No. 180, September Term, 1976, 365 A.2d 540 (Md. 1976)
(affirming juvenile court's judgment that appellant committed the act of solicitation of
prostitution), In re Elizabeth G., 126 Cal. Rptr. 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), reh'g denied
(affirming juvenile court's order declaring juvenile appellant to be delinquent in that
she solicited prostitution).
202 See In re Nicolette R., 779 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding
that the fact that the respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding was 12 and thus
too young to consent to sex was "irrelevant to the issue of whether she was properly
found to have committed an act, which if committed by an adult, would constitute the
crime of prostitution"). But see In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Tex. 2010)
(overturning the delinquency adjudication of a child accused of prostitution
"[bl ecause a thirteen-year-old child cannot consent to sex as a matter of law ... [so]
B.W. cannot be prosecuted as a prostitute under section 43.02 of the Penal Code").
203 See Bob Herbert, The Wrong Target, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008 at A25
(explaining that in cases of sex with minor children, "[11]f no money is involved, the
youngster is considered a victim. But if the man pays for the sex - even if the money
is going to the pimp, which is so often the case - the child is considered a prostitute
and thus subject in many venues to arrest and incarceration."). See also State v.
Brooks, 739 So. 2d 1223, 1224-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a defendant
who pled guilty to lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault upon a child was eligible for a
reduced sentence because the child in question was a "thirteen-year-old prostitute"
who "willing participated" in the sexual activity).
20 See Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Conceptualizing Juvenile Prostitution as Child
Maltreatment: Findings from the National Juvenile Prostitution Study, 15 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 18, 18 (2010).
205 See, e.g., Safe Harbour For Sexually Exploited Children Act, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 477 (McKinney 2011). Enacted by the New York State legislature in 2008, the law is
designed to offer a supportive, service-based, non-criminal response to children who
are "sexually exploited." The statute requires social services districts to identify the
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money is no longer treated as a "child" victimized by the sexual
contact but rather a consenting, complicit party. A child engaged in
commercial sex is viewed as promiscuous and insufficiently childlike
to benefit from the presumption of non-consent.20 6 Children deemed
to be promiscuous are, like those accused of certain violent crimes, no
longer seen as children worthy of any particular solicitude.
2. Heterosexism and Popular Views of Sexuality
LGBT children seeking asylum are also burdened by heterosexism
and, consequently, stereotypes regarding "homosexuals" and people
who do not conform to societal gender norms. The idea that
homosexuality is a disease continues to hold sway, even though no
medical authority holds that homosexuality is an infectious illness and
the American Psychiatric Association ceased to regard homosexuality
as a mental disorder in 1973.'0 As a result, "homosexuals" are viewed
as infected individuals who seek to spread their contagion to others,
particularly children.2 " Thus, "it is not uncommon for individuals to
express the view that already formed homosexuals deserve public
sympathy and protection, but that they should not be permitted to
spread their condition to others." 20 9
use of existing youth services, and to the extent that funds are available, provide
preventive services, such as short-term safe houses, for "sexually exploited youth." It
also requires the Family Court, with certain exceptions, to treat a youth under age 18
arrested for prostitution as a Person In Need of Supervision (PINS), rather than a
juvenile delinquent. However non-compliance by the youth may result in the case
being converted back to a juvenile delinquency proceeding. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR
THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LEGIS. SUMMARIES BY YEAR (2008),
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/law/summ-year/sum08.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011);
see also Connecticut Safe Harbor for Exploited Children Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
82 (2011) (revising Connecticut General Statute Section 53a-82 so that only a person
aged 16 or over can be charged with prostitution and providing that "ti]n any
prosecution of a person sixteen or seventeen years of age for [a prostitution] offense
... there shall be a presumption that the actor was coerced into committing such
offense by another person").
206 Cf. State v. Brooks, 739 So. 2d 1223, 1224-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that a defendant who was guilty of a lewd, lascivious or indecent act on a
child was eligible for a reduced sentence because, among other things, the victim was
a thirteen-year-old prostitute who was "looking for action").
207 Yoshino, supra note 139, at 786.
208 Id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance:
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1049-50
(2004) (noting that "Ilany traditionalists also consider homosexuality contagious in
some way").
209 Yoshino, supra note 139, at 811; See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW:
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 3-4, 298 (2002) (discussing the view that
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One example of this heterosexism is state legislation against
presenting any positive information regarding homosexuality in
schools. These so-called "no promo homo" statutes' purpose is
"ostensibly to prevent impressionable youth from being converted into
homosexuals[,] ... [which] casts the laws as defending against an act
of aggression on the part of homosexuals themselves."2 10 This attitude
reflects a belief that homosexuality is like a disease that children
should be shielded from catching. Children who learn about
homosexuality might recognize themselves in the description and
become gay.21 These laws amount to a demand that potentially gay or
lesbian children become heterosexual. Children are thus viewed as
"waverers" who could go either way, and these laws are "an attempt to
convert waverers into heterosexuals." 2 12
That children are thought of as "wavering" or "confused" is not
mere coincidence. Popular understandings of sexuality continue to be
influenced by Freud's theory that homosexuality is an instance of
youth can (and should) be protected from homosexuality, lest they fall "victim" to it).
New York gubernatorial candidate Carl Paladino expressed such a viewpoint when he
stated that although he is not homophobic, he would not march in a gay pride parade
because "I don't want [children] brainwashed into thinking that homosexuality is an
equally valid and successful option - it isn't." Elizabeth A. Harris, Paladino Laces
Speech with Antigay Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2010, at A17.
210 Yoshino, supra note 139, at 810-11.
211 Id. at 827. -
2 See id. at 811. The Kansas Court of Appeals similarly claimed that "[d]uring
early adolescence, children are in the process of trying to figure out who they are. A
part of that process is learning and developing their sexual identity. As a result, the
legislature could well have concluded that homosexual sodomy between children and
young adults could disturb the traditional sexual development of children." State v.
Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 236 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). The Court thus suggested not only
that the state had a legitimate interest in preventing children from becoming LGBT
adults, but that adolescent sexuality was mutable and could be altered by keeping
young people from having same-sex sexual relationships. The lower court's
description of the young man involved in the sex act at issue in the case is also
noteworthy. The Court pointedly objected to the fact that the 18-year-old in Limon
characterized the 14-year-old boy with whom he had voluntary oral sex as gay or
bisexual. The Court stated that "[l]abeling M.A.R. in this way is unfair... if M.A.R.'s
sexual identity was not well defined before his homosexual encounter with [the
defendant], M.A.R. might have become confused about his sexual identity ... .but] the
record does not show that M.A.R. was either homosexual or bisexual." Id. The Court
could conceive of only two possible identities for a 14-year-old boy: heterosexual or
"confused." See id. To infer that he might be gay or bisexual given that he voluntarily
had oral sex with another boy was "unfair" because the Court assumed he would
follow what it characterized as the "traditional sexual development of children" and
become heterosexual. See id.
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arrested development.213 I call this paradigm "Popular Freudianism."
In this view, adolescents may pass through a phase of same-sex
attraction, but will eventually return to "normal" heterosexuality.
The pervasive notion that children are wavering and should become
heterosexual by whatever means necessary has serious implications for
young people's sexual-orientation based asylum claims.215 First, it
suggests that adjudicators will have a difficult time accepting that
children are "really" LGBT. Second, it implies that adjudicators may
not recognize the harms inflicted upon LGBT youth because they will
fail to take their minority age into account in evaluating whether an
act rises to the level of persecution.
B. Determined Disbelief: Why Young People Are Asked for Objective
Evidence of Their Sexuality
The "Popular Freudianism" paradigm deems young people
incapable of determining that they are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender. It asserts that youths cannot comprehend their own
sexual orientations or gender identities, much less reliably articulate
them.216 This paradigm also construes human sexual development as a
steady progression towards conventionally gendered heterosexuality,
thereby suggesting that an LGBT-identified adolescent is defying the
"natural" course of events.217
213 See A Letter from Freud, 107 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 786, 786 (1951) (in which
Freud argues that "[hiomosexuality is ... produced by a certain arrest of sexual
development.").
214 SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (1905), reprinted in 7
THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD
(1901-1905): A CASE OF HYSTERIA, THREE ESSAYS ON SEXUALITY AND OTHER WORKS, 123-
246, 228 (James Strachey ed. and trans., Hogarth Press 1957) ("One of the tasks
implicit in object-choice is that it should find its way to the opposite sex. This, as we
know, is not accomplished without a certain amount of fumbling. Often enough the
first impulses after puberty go astray, though without any permanent harm resulting.
Dessoir has justly remarked upon the regularity with which adolescent boys and girls
form sentimental friendships with others of their own sex. No doubt the strongest
force working against a permanent inversion of the sexual object is the attraction
which the opposing sexual characters exercise upon one another") (citations omitted);
see also Ruskola, supra note 190, at 280.
215 See infra Parts Il.B-C.
216 See Ruskola, supra note 190, at 280-81.
217 See id. In reinforcing the notion that heterosexuality is not only the desired
outcome of adolescence, but the likely outcome, the popular Freudianism paradigm
could be said to erect a "confused and defiant" closet around young people who try to
come out as LGBT.
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This explains why asylum adjudicators decline to credit young
people's testimony regarding their sexual orientation even where it is
consistent, sincere, and unrefuted.m Instead, judges fault young
people for failing to provide various corroboration, such as a history of
same-sex sexual relationships or proof that a youth's family knew he
was gay.219 Without such evidence, adjudicators argue that the youth
cannot establish membership in the "homosexuals" social group.220
Importantly, that determination is not based on some contrary
evidence that the young people concerned are heterosexual. Instead,
heterosexuality is assumed and treated as the default.
While the desire for some corroboration to support an applicant's
eligibility for asylum might be understandable, it is important to
consider the actual probative value of such evidence. Studies in the
United States show that children become aware that they are gay,
lesbian, bixesual, or transgender years before they tell anyone about
their feelings. 22 1 The fact that a youth has not told her parents she is a
lesbian does not mean she is heterosexual. A lesbian youth facing
violence or hostility from her family and community might try to keep
her sexual orientation a secret by not talking about her identity, or
refraining from same-sex sexual relationships. Requiring such an
applicant to provide testimony from her family members or a history
of lesbian relationships to prove her sexual orientation effectively bars
her from asylum eligibility.
218 See supra Part I.
219 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
221 See Shira Maguen, Frank J. Floyd, Roger Bakeman & Lisa Armistead,
Developmental Milestones And Disclosure Of Sexual Orientation Among Gay, Lesbian,
And Bisexual Youths, 23 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 219, 225-26 (noting that only 13% of
the youth studied disclosed their sexual orientation at the same age they became
aware of it, while 88% became aware of their same-sex attraction at one age but did
not tell anyone about their identity until an older age.) Same-sex sexual attraction
begins to form in mid-childhood, and children's subjective awareness of these
attractions begins to take hold at approximately age ten. These patterns mirror those
of children who develop opposite-sex attractions. See Gilbert Herdt & Martha
McClintock, The Magical Age of 10, 29 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 587, 597-99 (2000), A
study of gay, lesbian, and bisexual youth of color in New York City found that these
young people first became aware of their same-sex attractions at age ten, first
considered that they might be gay, lesbian, or bisexual at ages 12-13, and conclusively
decided they were gay, lesbian, or bisexual at ages 14-15. See Margaret.Rosario et al.,
The Psychosexual Development of Urban Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths, 33J. SEx RES.
113, 117-18 (1996).
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Such a result is also inconsistent with the legal requirements for
asylum claims.2 2 Recognizing that asylum-seekers fleeing persecution
may have access to very little evidence to support their claim, the INA
allows a grant of asylum based on the applicant's testimony alone,
provided that testimony is consistent and credible.m The 2005 REAL
ID Act made the evidentiary requirements in asylum cases more
onerous. The REAL ID Act places the burden on an applicant to satisfy
the trier of fact that the applicant's testimony "is credible, is
persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that
the applicant is a refugee."224 The IJ may demand asylum-seekers
produce evidence corroborating their claim unless the 1J believes the
applicant does not have such proof and is unable to acquire it.2 25
Previously, courts refused to impose such a corroboration requirement
because refugees frequently flee their home countries with few
belongings and asylum claims are by nature difficult to document.2 2 6
Even post-REAL ID, however, an asylum applicant can only be
required to provide corroborating evidence if he has it or can
"reasonably obtain" it. 227 Demanding young LGBT people to produce
evidence they do not have and that is not "reasonably" available is
inconsistent with the statute. Requiring additional corroboration of a
youth's sexual identity because she is young also does not comport
with the Supreme Court's insistence in Roper and Graham that youth
must be a mitigating factor. Roper and Graham stand for the
proposition that children deserve more solicitude because of their age;
they cannot be treated worse because they are young.2 8
222 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2011) ("The testimony of the [asylumi applicant may be sufficient
to sustain the applicant's burden [of proof] without corroboration, but only if the
applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant's testimony is credible, is
persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a
refugee."); 8 C.F.R. §208.13 (2011) ("The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may
be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof [that he qualifies as a refugee under the
Act] without corroboration.").
223 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See Bolanos-Hemandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984)("[Tihe
imposition of such a [corroboration] requirement would result in the deportation of
many people whose lives genuinely are in jeopardy. . . . Persecutors are hardly likely
to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution.").
227 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
228 See Emens, supra note 179, at 53.
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C. The Failure to Recognize Mistreatment of LGBT Youth as Persecution
Asylum adjudicators also diverge from constitutional norms in their
failure to recognize abuses perpetrated against LGBT youth as acts of
persecution. In evaluating acts of violence against young LGBT
asylum-seekers, adjudicators often do not show of the abuse
persecution. The acts of rape perpetrated against Calle and Joaquin-
Porras, for example, were not viewed as persecutory acts against
children who deserve special protection because they are particularly
vulnerable. Rather, the adjudicators viewed these rapes as the
equivalent of "mere harassment" or "random violence" against
adults.2 29 The fact that Calle and Joaquin-Porras identified as being gay
was enough to make the crimes committed against them no longer
acts of persecution against children.230 One explanation for these
outcomes is that the IJs concluded that a person could not
simultaneously be a "child," who must be by definition non-sexual,23 '
and a "homosexual," who is assumed to be hypersexual.m'
Adjudicators hearing these cases also may not see applicants' rapes
as persecution because, at some level, they do not believe gay men can
be raped.233 There is an enduring stereotype that gay people are so
hypersexual that there is no sexual contact they do not welcome.23 4
Another J denied asylum to a man who had been subject to a series of
sexual assaults and rapes by the police because "the rape of a
homosexual cannot be considered an act [of persecution] equivalent
229 See Calle v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 264 Fed. App'x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11 Cir. 2005); Joaquin-Porras v.
Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2006).
230 See Calle, 264 Fed. Appx. at 884;Joaquin-Porras, 435 F.3d at 177.
231 See Sutherland, supra note 197, at 332. (noting that "[oln their face, age of
consent laws suggest that the only appropriate teenage sexuality is an absence of
sexuality.").
232 See MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE 70-71 (1997) (describing how gay
men are assumed to be hypersexual).
23 Id. (noting that gay men are stereotyped as "hypersexual beings always having
or wanting to have sex . . . [who] cannot be raped. . .. [Glay men are culturally
designed to be unrapeable, unable to be violated sexually on any level").
234 See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2161 (2003).
Similar tropes about the sexuality of Black women negatively affect the ability of rape
victims to achieve justice when their rapist is criminally prosecuted. Men of all races
who are convicted of raping Black women on average receive more lenient sentences
than those who rape white women. This is due to the impact of stereotypes about
Black women: "Blacks have long been portrayed as more sexual, more earthy, more
gratification-oriented. These sexualized images of race intersect with norms of
women's sexuality, norms that are used to distinguish good women from bad, the
madonnas from the whores." Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1271.
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to ethnic cleansing." 5 The only reason to emphasize that a rape
victim was a "homosexual" rather than some other kind of person is to
suggest that raping a "homosexual" is fundamentally different than
raping anyone else. 23 6 Indeed, the trope of the homosexual-as-predator
is so powerful that the IJ does not have to explicitly state it. Simply by
using the word "homosexual" to describe the applicant, the IJ
telegraphs that he is a sexual aggressor rather than a victim of an
unwanted sexual violation.
Similarly, it is no coincidence that the BIA stated that Geovanni
Hernandez-Montiel was mistreated "because of the way he dressed (as
a male prostitute)," despite the fact that Geovanni had never been
charged with, much less convicted of, prostitution.3  In labeling
Geovanni a prostitute, the BIA invoked the same logic present in
juvenile delinquency statutes that permit the prosecution of children
for alleged prostitution when they are legally too young to consent to
sex.3 The BIA marked him as a promiscuous sexual deviant, no
longer an innocent child in need of protection.
In the case of William Kimumwe, the IJ emphasized William's
testimony that a boy he had sex with when both were twelve years old
was not gay and that William had "lured" or convinced him to have
sex.240 Similarly, with regard to a boy William had sex with when he
and the boy were sixteen, "the 1J apparently believed that Kimumwe
had taken advantage of [him] by getting him drunk for the purpose of
having sex." 24 1 William's uncontradicted testimony was that both
sexual encounters were consensual, and that he did not coerce his
partners in any way.242 Despite his unrefuted testimony, the IJ viewed
William as a sexual predator, and that doomed his application. The IJ
concluded that William failed to provide adequate evidence that he
235 Morett v. Gonzales, 190 Fed. App'x 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2006).
236 See SCARCE, supra note 232, at 70-71; Elizabeth J. Kramer, When Men are
Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv 293, 319-
20 (1998) (arguing that evidence regarding a male rape victim's sexual orientation
should be inadmissible under rape shield laws because it is prejudicial and does not
bear on consent).
237 This is an example of what sociologist Jerry Himelstein called a "rhetorical
wink" - using a code phrase to communicate a well-understood but implicit meaning
without stating it directly (and thus allowing the speaker to disavow that meaning).
Lani Guinier, Clinton Spoke the Truth on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at A29.
23' Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000).
239 See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
240 Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 2005).
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was gay. The IJ also found that William's expulsion from school after
he had sex with a boy at age twelve and his arrest and detention by the
Zimbabwean authorities after he had sex at age sixteen were motivated
not by anti-gay animus. Rather, these were legitimate actions to
punish William for engaging in prohibited sexual conduct despite the
fact that William was never charged with any crime.24 3
The decision suggests that the IJ saw William not as a gay child who
had been singled out for mistreatment because of his sexual
orientation, but as a hypersexual predator who had lured his
heterosexual peers into gay sex and suffered legitimate consequences
as a result.244 The IJ's view of William appears to have been influenced
not just by heterosexism and anti-youth bias but also by racist
stereotypes. African-American men are frequently stereotyped as being
promiscuous and sexually aggressive. Such stereotypes about
African-Americans likely influence immigration adjudicators' views of
African asylum-seekers.246 In this case, when confronted with a young
black man who had been sexually active at an early age and who
admitted that his sexual partners did not identify as gay, the IJ did not
see a child who had been persecuted, but a sexually promiscuous
"recruiter" who deserved to be punished for luring straight boys into
gay sex."
Under Lawrence and Romer, however, "moral disapproval of [LGBT
people] cannot be a legitimate government interest. "248 Asylum
adjudicators, therefore, cannot reject an asylum applicant's claim
because they disapprove of the fact that he is gay or the fact that he
had consensual sex with peers who identified as straight. Similarly, the
Supreme Court's decisions in Roper and Graham make clear that all
children must be treated with special solicitude, even if they commit
243 Id.
244 See id at 321, 324.
245 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 81
(1999).
246 See, e.g., Deborah A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and
Sexual Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation Asylum Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135,149-50
(2006) (arguing that "essentialist racist stereotypes of black men as sexually aggressive
apply to both African-American men and African men").
247 The Court was in the grip of "the fundamental fear about homosexuality[,...
the apocalyptic 'fear of a queer planet,' the fear that homosexuality can spread without
being spread thin." Yoshino, supra note 139, at 802 (referencing MICHAEL WERNER,
FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (Michael Warner ed.,
1993).
248 State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 35 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam).
[Vol. 45:373416
Confounding Identities
adult-like acts. Thus, there is no basis for denying LGBT youth the
solicitude extended to other child asylum-seekers. Under its own
guidelines, the U.S. government must take the age of the victim into
account when weighing the seriousness of a persecutory act.249 Failing
to evaluate acts of abuse against LGBT youth with the same standard
used for other children's claims violates the constitutional norm
announced by Roper and Graham. LGBT children cannot be treated as
adults simply because they are LGBT.
IV. How YOUNG LGBT ASYLUM-SEEKERS ARE DENIED PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS
The asylum system has fallen behind constitutional norms by failing
to afford young LGBT asylum-seekers due process of law in the
adjudication of their claims. Young LGBT people are denied an
opportunity to fairly litigate their asylum claims in a number of ways.
First, the government does not take adequate steps to inform children
that they do not need their parents' consent to file an asylum claim.
Second, children who have been a derivative on a previous case filed
by a parent are frequently ordered removed without an opportunity to
be heard on their own independent asylum claim. Third, the failure to
automatically exempt children from the one-year filing deadline for
asylum results in the unfair denial of meritorious asylum claims.
Fourth, the failure to provide counsel to children in immigration court
denies them the ability to present their case. Finally, placing the
burden of proof solely on child asylum-seekers to prove that their
government persecuted them directly or was unable or unwilling to
protect them from mistreatment by private parties results in erroneous
and unfair asylum denials. These procedural failures in the asylum
system amount to an unconstitutional denial of procedural due
process to LGBT youth asylum-seekers.
The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process applies to all
persons in the United States, regardless of immigration status:
"[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may
be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards
of fairness encompassed in due process of law."2"o Even young LGBT
people who are in the United States without valid immigration status
are entitled to a fair hearing on their claim for asylum before they are
ordered removed. Asylum procedures that deny young LGBT asylum-
249 WEIS, supra note 103, at 19 ("The harm a child fears or has suffered ... may be
relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as persecution.").
250 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
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seekers an opportunity to be heard on their claim, or unfairly burden
their ability to present their case effectively, violate the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause."'
A. The Process of Asylum Adjudication
Young people who are not in immigration proceedings file their
asylum applications with the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS").252 An asylum officer with special training in international
law, country conditions, and other issues affecting asylum claims2..
adjudicates their claims following a non-adversarial asylum
interview.254 If the asylum officer decides not to grant the applicant
asylum, she refers the applicant to an 1J for removal proceedings.2 55
The applicant can then renew the application before the IJ, who will
review it de novo." 6
251 The determination of whether the denial of any procedural safeguard in a
governmental decisionmaking process constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment
due process clause involves a balancing test. The Supreme Court has emphasized that
it is necessary to weigh three distinct factors: "First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail." Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335-336 (1976).
252 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (2011). Researchers examining the treatment of children
seeking asylum in the United States have concluded that the non-adversarial setting of
an asylum interview is more appropriate for evaluating their claims. See BHABHA &
SCHMIDT, supra note 14, at 37 ("We recommend that all children's asylum cases
originate in the affirmative [asylum interview] process, with the defensive [adversarial
immigration court hearing] system reserved for cases that are denied.").
253 8 CFR §208.1(b) (2011) (requiring that asylum officers "receive special training
in international human rights law, non-adversarial interview techniques, and other
relevant national and international refugee laws and principles"); JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES,
ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ, AND PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 112 (2009) (noting that "the tenure
of every asylum officer begins with a five-week basic training course (including
testing). In addition, on a continuing basis, four hours a week are set aside for training
officers on new legal issues and country conditions").
254 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2011).
255 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (2011). Applicants who already have valid non-immigrant
or immigrant status, or Temporary Protected Status, or who have been paroled in to
the United States are not referred to an immigration judge; the asylum office simply
denies their claims and they remain in the status they had prior to applying for
asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2)-(3) (2011).
256 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (2011).
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Ordinarily, an asylum-seeker already in removal proceedings at the
time of filing her application would not be entitled to an asylum
interview;5 . her claim would only be reviewed by the 1J in an
adversarial removal hearing in immigration court. However, the
enactment of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
("TVPRA") altered the procedure for certain children."'
Unaccompanied immigrant children seeking asylum are now entitled
to have their claims heard by the Asylum Office in the first instance,
even if they are in removal proceedings when they file their
applications. 260 Minors who have a parent or legal guardian available
to care for them in the United States, or who are eighteen years or
older when they apply for asylum do not qualify for this benefit under
the TVPRA. 26' Accompanied minors and asylum-seekers over the age
of eighteen who are already involved in immigration court
proceedings must argue their case for the first time in the adversarial
setting of their removal hearings.
Aside from the TVPRA carve-out allowing some children to receive
an initial determination on their claim from an asylum officer, all
youths in immigration proceedings are treated exactly like adults.
They must meet the same legal definition of a "refugee" in order to
qualify for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of
persecution on the basis of a protected ground.26 2 Like adults, they
have a right to be represented by counsel in their removal hearing, but
only at their own expense.2 63 Neither the immigration statute nor the
regulations explicitly grant IJs the ability to appoint an attorney or a
257 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2011) ("Immigration judges shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over asylum applications filed by an alien who has been served . . . [with
a] charging document [that] has been filed with the Immigration Court.").
258 Id.
259 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act , Pub.
L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
260 Id. (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 (b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§1158(b)(3), to state "INITIAL JURISDICTION.-An asylum officer (as defined in
section 235(b)(1)(E)) shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed
by an unaccompanied alien child (as defined in section 462(g) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 279(g))), regardless of whether filed in accordance with
this section or section 235(b).").
261 See 6 U.S.C.S. § 279(g)(2) (2011) (defining an unaccompanied alien child as
one who has no lawful immigration status in the United States, has not attained 18
years of age and for whom there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States, or
no parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care and physical
custody).
262 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
263 Immigration and Nationality Act § 292, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (2011).
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guardian ad litem for a child in removal proceedings, regardless of how
young or immature that child is. 264 While an experienced prosecutor
will represent the government in the adversarial hearing, a majority of
young people are pro se.265 The hearing is formal both in tone and in
setting, involving an oath, formal testimony, cross-examination, and
the introduction of evidence. Children unable to secure counsel must
navigate this hearing on their own.
The Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") and the
Asylum Office each adopted guidelines for adjudicators handling
children's asylum claims.266 The Asylum Office guidelines are more
substantive; for example they clarify that what constitutes persecution
varies according to the age of the asylum applicant, so that harm to a
child may constitute persecution even when it would not rise to that
level for an adult. 267 The Asylum Office guidelines are also mandatory
and asylum officers must follow them when adjudicating children's
claims. 268 The EOIR guidelines, however, are merely recommendations
to IJs. 269 They amount to a collection of discretionary measures 1Js can
take to make a child more comfortable during the hearing, such as
choosing not to wear a robe, giving an opening statement explaining
264 The power to appoint a GAL or an attorney for a child who is unable to
represent herself in immigration court is arguably implied by the Fifth Amendment
due process clause, but no published case reports an instance in which an IJ actually
appointed either a GAL or a lawyer for a child in immigration proceedings.
265 See Women's Refugee Comm'n & Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Halfway
Home: Unaccompanied Children In Immigration Custody 23 (2009), available at http://
womensrefugeecommission.org/docs/halfway-home.pdf (estimating that 60% of all
children in immigration proceedings lack legal representation); Cara Anna, Children
Facing Deportation Have Few Advocates; Court System Designed for Adults Just Starting
to Adapt for Youths, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 10, 2006 at A03 (noting that half of
unaccompanied minor children appearing in immigration court in 2006 were
unrepresented). In fiscal year 2009, only 39% of all respondents in immigration court
were represented by attorneys. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2009
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK GI (March 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy09syb.pdf.
266 See WEIS, supra note 103; David L. Neal, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev.,
Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 07:01: Guidelines for Immigration Court
Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm07/07-01.pdf (hereinafter Neal, Guidelines
for Unaccompanied Alien Children).
267 WEIS, supra note 103, at 19.
268 See id. at 18 ("In assessing a child's claim of persecution, asylum adjudicators
should follow the procedural considerations outlined above.").
269 Neal, Guidelines for Unaccompanied Alien Children, supra note 266, at 3 ("These
guidelines are suggestions that should be applied as circumstances warrant.").
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what is happening, or letting the child hold a toy while testifying.2 70
Neither set of guidelines alters the legal standard for the adjudication
of asylum claims nor explicitly gives the adjudicators the power to
appoint an attorney or a guardian ad litem for a child.2 '
Following the removal hearing, either the asylum-seeker or the
government may appeal to the BIA within thirty days of the J's
decision. The BIA is often criticized for failing to give meaningful
review to immigrants whose asylum cases were denied by the 1J. A
series of "streamlining" reforms under Attorney General John Ashcroft
made very brief affirmances by a single BIA member the norm, with
very few cases granted a full review by a three-member panel of the
BIA.2 2 Asylum-seekers who lose their claim before the BIA can file a
petition for review with the court of appeals having jurisdiction over
the location of the removal hearing.2" The courts grant the BIA a great
deal of deference on review, however, particularly with regard to
questions of fact; thus, reversals of the administrative agency's
decisions are rare.27" A full discussion of the inadequacy of review of
Immigration Court decisions is beyond the scope of this paper, but it
is worth noting that LGBT youth who lose their asylum claim before
the IJ have very little chance of that decision being fully reviewed,
much less overturned." This is particularly true given that young
people have no right to the appointment of an attorney to represent
them at the BIA and the courts of appeal.
270 Id. at 3-6.
271 Id. at 4 ("Issues of law - questions of admissibility, eligibility for relief, etc. -
are governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act and the regulations.... [These
guidelines] cannot provide a basis for providing relief not sanctioned by law . . . .
Neither the INA nor the regulations permit immigration judges to appoint a legal
representative or a guardian ad litem. Immigration judges should encourage the use of
appropriate pro bono resources whenever a child respondent is not represented.").
272 See John Palmer, Stephen Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many
People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 1, 28
(2005).
273 Immigration and Naturalization Act §242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. §1252(b)(2) (2011).
274 The federal Courts of Appeal reviewed 4215 petitions for review by asylum-
seekers in 2004 and 2005. They ruled in favor of the asylum-seeker in only 15% of
those cases. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz and Philip Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L.REv. 295, 362 (2007).
275 RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 253, at 71.
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B. The Specific Barriers LGBT Youths Confront in Litigating Asylum
Claims
1. The Perception that Parental Consent or Notification is
Required
DHS takes the position that a child older than twelve is capable of
deciding whether to apply for asylum and need not seek the consent of
a parent. 76 A thirteen-year-old LGBT child would not even be
required to inform her parents that she had sought asylum. However,
as a practical matter, this DHS policy is not widely publicized, and
many children are likely unaware of it.2 77 Asylum Office policy also
requires that asylum officers ask child applicants whether their parents
are aware of the application and if so, whether they consent to it.17"
Lack of parental consent for or notification of an asylum application is
276 See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 732-36 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the
parents of Walter Polovchak, a 12-year-old boy who applied for asylum from the
Soviet Union and was granted it over their objection, should have been granted formal
notice of his pending asylum application and an opportunity to be heard before
Walter's application was granted); Memorandum from Bo Cooper, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Commissioner Doris Meissner
(Jan. 3, 2000), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/
Archive%201998-2008/2000/ins counsel elian-gonzalez.pdf (last visited December
19, 2011) ("The Polovchak case recognized that a twelve-year-old boy was sufficiently
mature to be able to articulate a claim in express contradiction to the wishes of his
parents. It did not specifically reach issues relating to the capacity of a younger child,
but opined that a twelve-year-old was probably at the low end of maturity necessary to
sufficiently distinguish his asylum interests from those of his parents.").
277 For example, information on this policy does not appear in the information about
applying for asylum on the USCIS website or in the instructions to the asylum
application form. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM I-
589, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-589instr.pdf (last visited December 19,
2011). Indeed, the USCIS webpage related to "Minor Children Applying for Asylum By
Themselves" indicates that child applicants will be asked if they "have a guardian or
parent" and whether that person "allowed [them] to apply for asylum," which arguably
implies that parental permission is required. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
MINOR CHILDREN APPLYING FOR ASYLUM BY THEMSELVES, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/
?vgnextoid=21bf0l 1522a9c1 1OVgnVCM100000471819OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=
f39d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited December 19, 2011).
278 Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service, to HQRAIO 120/9.7 (August 14, 2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/Minor%20Children%2OAppl
ying%2Ofor%2OAsylum%20By%20Themselves/procedures-minor-children-raps.pdf
(last visited December 19, 2011) (stating that when interviewing a minor child
asylum-seeker, "Itihe Asylum Officer should ... elicit information about ... parental
knowledge and consent of the application for asylum[.] ").
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not a basis for denying an application .2 9 But, this standard inquiry of
all children seeking asylum might lead applicants to believe that
parental notification or permission is required.
Parental consent or notification is required before minor children
can make many significant life decisions: several states require a minor
to notify her parents or get their permission before obtaining an
abortion; in many states, parental consent is required for a child to get
married, obtain medical treatment, or take a job; and a child must
notify her parent before legally changing her name. Similarly, under
federal law, seventeen-year-old children can join the U.S. military, but
they must have parental consent. The government's failure to inform
potential asylum applicants that parental notification or permission is
not required before a minor can seek asylum constitutes a significant
barrier to their filing an application. LGBT youth who are afraid to
come out to their parents are not going to ask them for help when
filing an asylum application on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity; nor are they going to file an application alone if they
think their parents will be told about it. 2
The U.S. government's failure to tell children that they can apply for
asylum without their parents' knowledge or involvement likely
discourages young LGBT people from seeking asylum.2"' Children
who do not apply because they are afraid their parents will learn they
are LGBT and reject them obviously will not receive a hearing on their
claim. Even if the children seek asylum after they become adults, the
one-year deadline may bar their applications."' The failure to make
children aware of their ability to file an application independent of
their parents creates a barrier to the fair adjudication of their asylum
eligibility that is both counterproductive and unnecessary. It may even
279 Id.
280 Researchers have identified fear of disclosure as an important reason why LGBT
youth do not seek help when they are subjected to homophobic or anti-transgender
harassment. See, e.g., Warren J. Blumenfeld and R.M. Cooper, LGBT and Allied Youth
Response to Cyberbulling: Policy Implications, 3 INT. J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 114, 123
(2010) (finding that LGBT teenagers subjected to cyberbullying were reluctant to tell
their parents because they feared revealing their sexual orientation).
281 Susan Hazeldean and Pradeep Singla, Out in the Cold: The Challenges of
Representing Immigrant Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 7 BENDER'S
IMMIGR. REV. 642 (2002) ("Some parents ... want nothing to do with their child after
they find out about his or her sexual orientation or gender identity. Many will even
refuse to help their own child gain lawful immigration status once they know she is
LGBT.").
282 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2011).
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amount to a constitutional due process violation if it prevents LGBT
children from obtaining a hearing on their claims."'
2. Children Previously Ordered Deported in an Unrelated Case
Some LGBT youth are legally barred from applying for asylum
because they have an outstanding removal order against them. Most
children who apply for immigration benefits in the U.S. do so as
derivatives of an application their parent filed. 84 For example, parents
applying for asylum or permanent residency can include their
unmarried children who are under twenty-one years old as derivatives
on the application, and those children are granted the status along
with the parent.28 5 Children who seek an immigration benefit as a
derivative on a parent's case usually are not present during the
adjudication of the claim." Regulations authorize IJs to waive the
presence of a derivative child during the adjudication of her parents'
application; this is standard practice in the nation's immigration
courts. In fact, children who are derivatives on a parent's claim for
asylum or other relief are virtually invisible during the decision-
making process. If an 1J denies the parent's claim and orders the
parent removed from the country, the IJ will likely order the derivative
child to be removed as well. 289 A child can be ordered removed during
proceedings in which she never participated. She might not even learn
of the removal order until years later.290 The resulting removal order is
283 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An
essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.' ") (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950)).
284 David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's
Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991 (2002) ("The vast
majority of children encountered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
are derivatives of adults in the context of family immigration.").
285 8 U.S.C. H§ 1153(d), 1158(b)(3)(2011).
286 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25 (2011) (allowing the IJ to waive the presence of the child).
287 Id.
28 See Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied
Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84, 87
(1999)("laccompanied children have tended to be subsumed within their family's
asylum application; indeed both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
... and the INS have pointed out that invisibility is a common problem for refugee
children.").
2 Thronson, supra note 284, at 996.
290 "It is not uncommon for children who are later separated from their parents to
learn that an immigration court ordered them removed in absentia as a derivative of a
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an enormous hurdle for a child asserting her own independent claim
to asylum either during the parents' proceedings or at a later date.
A young person under such an order of removal is not eligible to
apply for asylum unless the immigration court proceedings are
reopened and the removal order is vacated."' Under current
regulations, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the
entry of a removal order, unless the movant is seeking asylum based
on changed conditions in her country of origin.29 2 This exception is
unlikely to apply to LGBT youth, however, because their asylum
claims are not grounded in changed country conditions but rather
changed personal circumstances - namely the realization that they
face persecution based on their sexual orientation or gender
identity."9 This situation deprives young people of any opportunity to
be heard and likely constitutes a denial of due process under the Fifth
Amendment.
3. Asylum Claims Time-Barred Under the One-Year Deadline
Asylum applications generally must be filed within one year of the
applicant's last entry into the United States, unless "changed
circumstances" or "extraordinary circumstances" justify a delay.'
Regulations indicate that, being an unaccompanied minor is an
"extraordinary circumstance" that would exempt an applicant from
the one-year deadline.295 The BIA has ruled that a fifteen-year-old who
parent in an immigration proceeding of which the children had no knowledge." Id.
291 See 8 CFR § 1208(g)(2)(i) (stating that a person previously ordered removed
who has a credible fear of persecution can apply only for withholding of removal, not
asylum); 8 CFR § 1208.4(b)(3) (noting that a person who was the subject of
previously completed removal proceedings must file her asylum application with the
immigration court along with a motion to reopen the prior proceeding).
292 8 C.F.R. H§ 1003.23(b)(1), (b)(4)(i). Separate rules also apply to removal
orders entered in absentia. An immigrant also has 180 days to move to reopen a
removal order entered in absentia, and can move to reopen at any time if she never
received notice of the hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4) (ii).
293 See Ait Ali v. Gonzales, 160 Fed. App'x 485, 486-87 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the B.I.A. committed no error in denying a motion to reopen filed by an applicant
who only "came out" as gay after the 90-day-deadline for filing a motion to reopen
had passed: "Since Ait Ali says that he was born gay, the 'change' that he is asserting
was the public admission, which occurred here, not in Algeria. . . . When . . . an
asylum applicant waits more than 90 days to file a motion to reopen based on a
change in personal circumstances . . . the motion is too late.").
294 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(B)
(2011). There is no deadline for applying for withholding of removal or relief under
the Convention Against Torture.
295 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2011) (stating that the term "extraordinary
2011]1 425
University of California, Davis
was in detention during his entire first year in the United States
qualified for asylum even though his application was filed after the
one-year deadline.296 The BIA implied, however, that not all minor
children automatically qualify for the "extraordinary circumstances"
exception even if they are unaccompanied.
The one-year deadline operates to prevent many people who would
otherwise be eligible for asylum from obtaining it.298 It is particularly
difficult for LGBT refugees to file their asylum applications within one
year of their arrival in the United States.2 9 Many LGBT asylum-seekers
are profoundly traumatized and ashamed by their sexual orientation or
gender identity.300 Having spent years being abused by their families,
neighbors, community members, and the authorities for being LGBT,
they find even acknowledging their identities profoundly
frightening. 01 Many recent LGBT immigrants are isolated, rejected by
their immigrant community for being LGBT and by the larger
circumstances" may include "[l]egal disability (e.g., the applicant was an
unaccompanied minor ... ) during the 1-year period after arrival").
296 Y-C-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 286, 288 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a child who entered
the U.S. at 15, was detained throughout his first year in the country, and who filed
while still a minor would not be barred from asylum even though he failed to meet the
one-year deadline: "On these facts, we find that the respondent has established
extraordinary circumstances for the delay in filing his application for asylum")
(emphasis added).
297 Id.
298 The effect is draconian: unless an applicant qualifies for an exception under the
rule, she must be denied asylum, even if she is a bona fide refugee. A recent study
found that one in five asylum seekers whose asylum cases were appealed to the Board
of Immigration Appeals "have missed the deadline or are alleged to have missed it."
HEARTLAND ALLIANCE ET AL., THE ONE-YEAR ASYLUM DEADLINE AND THE BIA: No
PROTECTION, No PROCESS 6 (2010).
299 Victoria Neilson & Aaron Morris, The Gay Bar: The Effect of the One-Year Filing
Deadline on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and HIV-Positive Foreign Nationals
Seeking Asylum or Withholding of Removal, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 233, 262-65 (2006); see
also Philip G. Schrag & Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a Model of
Fair Procedure, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 267, 279, 271 (1997) ("Refugees had many
different reasons for having waited for more than a year before filing. The reasons
included: ignorance of the asylum process; more urgent needs to find family, friends,
food and shelter in the United States; the inability, following torture and the onset of
post-traumatic stress syndrome, to tell their stories to advocates, much less official
governmental authorities; the inability to pay lawyers or locate free sources of
professional assistance; the inability to obtain promptly the documents needed to file
for asylum or prove a claim; and deliberate decisions to wait before filing for asylum,
hoping that conditions would change for the better and permit the refugee to return
home.").
"0 Laurie Berg & Jenni Millbank, Constructing the Personal Narratives of Lesbian,
Gay, and Bisexual Asylum Seekers, 22J. REFUGEE STUD. 195, 196 (2009).
301 Id. at 198.
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community for being immigrants.30 2 As such, they are less able to learn
about the process of applying for asylum than other refugees and may
not know it exists. If they are aware of asylum, they do not necessarily
realize that they would be eligible to apply based on the persecution
they face for their sexual orientation or gender identity.303
These profound barriers to filing an application within one year of
arrival apply with particular force to LGBT children and young adults.
Young LGBT asylum-seekers are less likely to have parents who
support their asylum claims and are willing to help them apply than
children seeking asylum based on a characteristic they share with a
parent, like ethnic or religious persecution.3 * Parents who are
unaware, unsympathetic, or hostile towards 'their child's sexual
orientation or gender identity are unlikely to help her file an asylum
application on that basis.0 ' Consequently, LGBT children might be
afraid to apply for asylum because they believe doing so will require a
parent's knowledge or consent.306
An LGBT young person who travels to the United States with a
parent or guardian is not an unaccompanied minor, but her age
should still trigger the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the
one-year deadline.307 While the regulations specifically mention "being
an unaccompanied minor" as an example of a "legal disability" that
would constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying delayed filing,
the ordinary meaning of "legal disability" includes all minor children,
not just those who live apart from their parents.30 s Any minor child is
under a legal disability that should qualify as an exception to the one-
year deadline under the regulations.309
302 Neilson, The Gay Bar, supra note 299, at 264; John Leland, Gays Seeking Asylum
Find Familiar Prejudices in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug.1, 2001, at A10.
303 Neilson, The Gay Bar, supra note 299, at 263.
31 See Hazeldean, supra note 281, at 642.
305 Id.
306 See supra notes 276-283 and accompanying text.
3'0 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) (2011).
308 See id. (stating that extraordinary circumstances "may include but are not
limited to: . . . (ii) Legal disability (e.g., the applicant was an unaccompanied minor or
suffered from a mental impairment) during the 1-year period after arrival."); BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 764 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "legal incapacity" to include minority);
Lee Berger & Davina Figeroux, Protecting Accompanied Child Refugees from the One-
Year Deadline: Minority As A Legal Disability, 16 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 855, 858-9 (2002).
309 LGBT young people might also qualify for an extraordinary circumstances
exception to the one-year-deadline because they face other severe challenges, such as
homelessness or mental illness. A young LGBT asylum-seeker who has experienced
anti-gay abuse might be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, for example, or
other mental or physical impairments. As noted above, an LGBT child might also face
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Therefore, due process requires a hearing on the asylum claim of an
applicant who missed the one-year deadline because she was a minor
during her first year in the United States - she suffered from legal
incapacity during the only period she could file an application. To
deny such an applicant a hearing on the merits of her asylum claim
would mean she had no opportunity to be heard and did not enjoy
due process of law.
4. The Failure to Appoint Counsel for LGBT Children Seeking
Asylum
The lack of legal counsel for indigent asylum-seekers makes
applying for asylum daunting even for adults. Children and young
people who have suffered profound trauma and who face life-
threatening violence if returned to their home countries are ill
equipped to navigate the asylum process without the assistance of a
professional advocate. 3 "o To their credit, a number of immigration
courts have tried to address this problem by establishing "juvenile
dockets" whereby cases involving unaccompanied minor children are
all held on a particular day and pro bono attorneys are recruited to
screen and represent the young people who appear.3 11 The Office of
Refugee Resettlement also developed an Unaccompanied Child Pro
Bono Program and contracted with nonprofits to provide some
representation for unaccompanied minors in immigration
proceedings. 3 12 Despite these efforts, however, the majority of minors
in immigration proceedings have no counsel. They must represent
isolation in a refugee community, extreme family hostility, language barriers, and
other such challenges. All of these should qualify as extraordinary circumstances
justifying an exception to the one-year-deadline. See IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, LESSON PLAN OVERVIEW FOR ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING:
ONE YEAR FILING DEADLINE 20 (2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/
Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%2OAsylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/One-
Year-Filing-Deadline-3 lauglO.pdf.
310 Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of
Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 247, 255-57 (2010).
311 There are juvenile dockets at the immigration courts in Phoenix, Los Angeles,
San Diego, San Francisco, Miami, Chicago, New York, Harlingen, Houston, and San
Antonio. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Unaccompanied Alien Children in
Immigration Proceedings (Apr. 22, 2008) (noting that "EOIR has established 'juvenile
dockets' throughout the country to facilitate consistency, encourage child-friendly
courtroom practices, and promote pro bono representation for unaccompanied alien
children").
31 Young & McKenna, supra note 310, at 257.
313 See WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N & ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP,
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themselves in a formal proceeding against an experienced government
prosecutor. This constitutes a denial of procedural due process
strikingly similar to forcing a child to appear without counsel in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding. 14
Courts have repeatedly held that the Sixth Amendment provides no
categorical right to appointed counsel in immigration proceedings."
Several courts have stated that a due process right to appointed
counsel may exist in exceptional cases when "fundamental fairness" is
at stake. 16 Unfortunately, "in practice the protection has proven
hollow. There have been no published decisions requiring
appointment of counsel in removal proceedings under the
fundamental fairness test."317 Still, the failure to provide counsel to
children in immigration proceedings arguably violates their Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law. 1 Certainly, the lack of
counsel is especially troubling in cases where respondents with
diminished capacity, such as minor children, are forced to represent
themselves in proceedings they cannot fully comprehend.1
HALFWAY HOME: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION CUSTODY 23 (2009),
available at http:// womensrefugeecommission.org/does/halfwayhome.pdf (estimating
that 60% of all children in immigration proceedings lack legal representation);
Margaret Graham Tebo, Children Without a Country, A.B.A. J., Mar, 1, 2004, available
at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/children without_acountry/ (noting
that " [immigrant] children and teens wait in federal custody, most with no attorneys
to advocate for them"); Anna, supra note 265, at A03.
314 The Supreme Court found that children facing juvenile delinquency charges
were entitled to counsel in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35 (1967).
3is See, e.g., Mustata v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022 n.6 (6th Cir.
1999) (noting that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil deportation
proceedings), reh'g denied, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26528 (1999); Castaneda-Suarez v.
INS, 993 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1993) (same); Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d
931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
316 See, e.g., Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990); Escobar Ruiz v.
INS, 787 F.2d 1294, 1297 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986); Barthold v. I.N.S., 517 F.2d 689, 691
(5th Cir. 1975); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568-9 (6th Cir. 1975).
317 Note, A Second Chance: The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration
Removal Proceedings, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1544, 1549 (2007).
318 The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process applies to all persons in the
United States, regardless of immigration status. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (" [A]liens who have once passed through our
gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.").
31" A lawsuit is currently pending in the Central District of California on behalf of
indigent immigration detainees suffering from mental illnesses seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief including the appointment of counsel to represent them in
immigration court pursuant to the Fifth Amendment due process clause. See generally
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ("Because
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5. Denying Asylum for Failure to Seek Police Protection in the
Country of Origin
Many LGBT young people suffer mistreatment at the hands of
private actors, which adds an additional layer of difficulty to their
asylum claims. An applicant who has been harmed by a private
individual must show that her government was "unwilling or unable
to control" the perpetrator.32 0 Without such evidence, the harm
inflicted on the applicant is not past persecution but mere private
harm that does not form the basis for a grant of asylum.3 2' s are quick
to dismiss the harm inflicted on LGBT youth on that basis.322 For
example, Olivia Nabulwala sought asylum because, among other
abuses, her relatives arranged to have her raped because she was a
lesbian.323 The IJ viewed Nabulwala's family-arranged rape as "private
family mistreatment," and denied her application for asylum. 3 24
Sadly, Nabulwala's experience is not unique; many LGBT young
people experience horrific abuse from parents and other family
members desperate to make them gender normative and
heterosexual.3 25 Indeed, the family is a key site for the formation of
traditional sex roles and the perpetuation of compulsory
heterosexuality. 326 As Wayne Koestenbaum stated, "home" has "grim
meanings for the gay kid or the kid on the verge of claiming that
ambiguous identity. Home is the boot camp of gender; at home, we are
Plaintiffs are mentally incompetent, they are likely to be irreparably harmed if they are
unable to meaningfully participate in their respective immigration proceedings").
320 Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2010); see Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2011).
321 Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2005) ("Action by non-governmental
actors can undergird a claim of persecution only if there is some showing that the
alleged persecutors are in league with the government or are not controllable by the
government.").
322 See Liu v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 278 Fed. App'x 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2008); Janem v.
Mukasey, 295 Fed. App'x 89, 92 (7th Cir. 2008).
323 Nabulwala also testified that her father physically assaulted her because she is a
lesbian, and she was attacked by a mob, resulting in an overnight hospitalization.
Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1118, 1116-17 (8th Cir. 2007).
324 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the IJ had inappropriately focused on
whether the rape was sponsored or authorized by the government, instead of
determining whether the government was unwilling or unable to control the
perpetrators, which is the appropriate standard. The case was remanded for the BIA to
address that issue. Id. at 1119.
325 See Marouf, supra note 21, at 84.
326 Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting, and Representing
LGBTQ Youth, 6 NEv. LJ. 774, 787 (2006).
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supposed to learn how to be straight."3 27 An LGBT child can be a
source of immense shame to a family.3 28 As such, the pressure to force
a child to conform to societal expectations can be great: "In most
societies, women's sexual behavior and their conformity to traditional
gender roles [signify] the family's value system. Thus, in many
societies, a lesbian daughter ... can be seen as 'proof of the lax morals
of a family."32 9 Parents are constantly bombarded by the message that
they have failed if their child is not "normal." In that situation, it is
hardly surprising that some parents would resort to extreme measures,
including rape, violent abuse, and even murder, to change their child,
punish her, or end the shame she brings on the family.
When a child subject to this kind of abuse applies for asylum, the
case often turns on whether the applicant reported the abuse to the
police and if so, whether the police took any action. In cases where the
asylum-seeker did not make a police report, courts frequently
conclude that she has failed to establish that the government was
unwilling or unable to control the perpetrators.33 0 While an applicant
who did not make a police report can try to demonstrate that such a
report would have been futile, this is an extremely difficult standard to
meet."3 The asylum-seeker must produce documentation of
contemporaneous country conditions proving that the police would
have taken no action had she filed a report, such as evidence that the
police were involved in or indifferent to incidents of violence against
gay people.m Even when such evidence is submitted, an adjudicator
can still properly consider the applicant's failure to report the abuse in
327 Id. at 787 n.64 (quoting WAYNE KOESTENBAUM, THE QUEEN'S THROAT: OPERA,
HOMOSEXUALITY, AND THE MYSTERY OF DESIRE 47 (1993)).
328 See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Latinas - Everywhere Alien: Culture,
Gender, and Sex, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 62 (Adrien Wing, ed., 2nd ed.
2003).
'9 Id. (quoting Oliva M. Espin, Leaving the Nation and Joining the Tribe: Lesbian
Immigrants Crossing Geographical and Identity Borders, 19(4) WOMEN & THERAPY 99,
103 (1996)).
330 See, e.g., Galicia v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 446, 448 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming an 1J's
finding that petitioner "did not show that the harassment he suffered was by the
government or a group the government could not control" where, inter alia, the
petitioner did not inform authorities of his attack).
331 See, e.g., lzquierdo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 352 Fed. App'x 682, 684 (3rd Cir. 2009)
(finding an applicant who failed to report sexual abuse committed against him from
age 8 until age 14 failed to demonstrate that following up with police would have been
futile even though he submitted evidence of police involvement in anti-gay
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determining whether she met her burden to establish that the police
were "unable or unwilling to control" the abuse.
Young LGBT people are doubly disadvantaged by the requirement
that a victim report mistreatment to the police. Like all children, they
do not necessarily have the ability to independently seek police
assistance: "The requirement that government protection be sought
presupposes an unmediated relationship between the applicant and
the state."334 In reality, however, children do not directly interact with
the police or other government entities. In most instances, any
decision to contact the police would necessarily involve a parent or
other adult. Of course, an LGBT child's parents might very well be the
ones inflicting harm upon her, as in the case of Olivia Nabulwala.336
Even if someone outside the family is abusing the child, she might face
further violence from her parents if she tells them about the
mistreatment she has suffered. Alternatively, her parents might not file
a report because they are ashamed or embarrassed to tell the police
that their child was singled out for homophobic or anti-transgender
abuse. In many places, a child without a parent willing to act on her
behalf has no ability to file a police report.3 Making a finding of
persecution contingent upon proof that such a child sought police
protection effectively bars her from asylum eligibility.338
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE ADJUDICATION OF ASYLUM
CLAIMS FILED BY LGBT CHILDREN AND YOUNG ADULTS
A number of reforms are needed to bring asylum law into line with
current constitutional norms on the rights of LGBT people and youth
and to ensure that young LGBT asylum-seekers receive a fair hearing
on their claims. Some of the following recommendations require
legislative action, but many should be implemented by asylum
adjudicators themselves. Other recommendations are directed at
young LGBT asylum-seekers and their advocates. These reforms would
ensure that LGBT young people receive a fair hearing on their claims
for asylum without being misjudged according to inaccurate
stereotypes or forestalled from applying by unfair procedural
roadblocks.
333 Id. at 684 n.5.
3 Bhabha & Young, supra note 288, at 107.
335 Id.
336 See Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007).
337 See Bhabha & Young, supra note 288, at 107.
338 Id. at 108.
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A. End the Status/Conduct Distinction in Asylum Adjudication
Asylum adjudicators should end their focus on the imagined
distinction between "homosexual conduct" and LGBT identity.3 As
Lawrence and its progeny make clear, expressing one's sexual
orientation or gender identity by engaging in intimate relationships,
making verbal statements, wearing expressive clothing, and
associating with other LGBT people are key parts of being LGBT. Acts
of mistreatment directed at a person for these kinds of "conduct" are
anti-gay or anti-transgender abuse." There is simply no basis for
ruling that a gay boy who is incarcerated for having sex with another
gay boy has been punished because of his behavior and not because of
his sexual orientation. Such acts of anti-gay abuse must be recognized
for what they are: persecution because of sexual orientation. The
victims of such persecution deserve asylum.
B. Stop Demanding Corroboration of a Youth's Identity That Does Not
Exist
Asylum adjudicators should end the practice of demanding
additional proof from LGBT youth regarding their sexual identity that
they simply do not have and cannot possibly obtain. Such evidentiary
requirements are grounded in heterosexist, anti-child stereotypes that
deny the existence of LGBT children and are contrary to law.14 1 Under
the asylum statute, applicants can only be required to produce
corroborating evidence if he has it or can "reasonably obtain" it. 42 in
the case of a young person who has never spoken about her sexual
orientation to her parents, parental testimony on the subject is not
available and would not be probative. Similarly, a youth who identifies
as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender but who has not had a sexual
relationship, cannot be required to produce evidence of same-sex
sexual activity if it does not exist.' The credible testimony of an
"' Supra Part II.
340 See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005) (there is "no
appreciable difference between an individual . . . being persecuted for being a
homosexual and being persecuted for engaging in homosexual acts"); Maldonado v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 188 F. App'x 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The fact that Maldonado was
targeted by the police only while engaged in an elective activity [leaving gay discos at
night] does not foreclose the possibility that he was persecuted on account of his
membership in a particular social group.").
34 Supra Part Ill.
342 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A.
§1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
34 See generally State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 35 (Kan. 2005) (noting that a child's
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asylum applicant as to her sexual orientation or gender identity is
sufficient to corroborate her asylum claim under the immigration
statute and regulations and should be accepted as such.
C. Utilize a Child-Specific Standard for Evaluating Whether Harm
Suffered by an LGBT Child Rises to the Level of Persecution
The U.S. Government takes the position that harm to a child can
qualify as persecution even when it would not be serious enough to
constitute persecution if inflicted on an adult."' This child-specific
standard should be applied to LGBT youths' asylum claims. Many
LGBT youths report verbal abuse and violence perpetrated by fellow
students at their schools, as well as abuse by neighbors, family
members, and strangers. Such mistreatment can have a profound
impact on children, and courts should give that due consideration in
determining whether the harm constitutes persecution.3  Lovis Liantu
Liu was beaten by his father and his neighbors, verbally harassed by
his fellow students and threatened with expulsion from school because
he was gay.346 Anonymous individuals also painted graffiti on his
house, poisoned his dog, and left a note "referencing his sexual
orientation."3 " The BIA and the Third Circuit held that the
mistreatment Liu had faced was insufficiently serious to constitute
persecution - apparently without considering the relevant fact that
he was a child when these acts took place. 4 It seems quite possible,
however, that a minor child who was physically assaulted by his own
father, verbally harassed by his peers, beaten by his neighbors, and
whose home was defaced and dog killed to punish him for being gay
experienced "the infliction of suffering or harm . . . .'"' Asylum
adjudicators should evaluate LGBT children's asylum claims using the
same standard applied to other children.
sexual orientation is established by age fourteen and is not affected by the sexual
experiences he or she has as a teenager).
34 WEIS, supra note 103, at 19.
31 See id.
346 Liu v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 278 Fed. App'x 212, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2008).
1 Id. at 214.
348 Id.
3 Prasad v. I.N.S., 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
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D. Inform Children That They Can Apply for Asylum Without Parental
Consent
DHS should inform potential child asylum-seekers that they have
the right to apply for asylum without telling their parents or seeking
their consent. This could be done quite simply by stating clearly in the
instructions on the asylum application form and the USCIS website
that parental consent is not required for children to apply for asylum.
Asylum officers adjudicating children's claims should also tell them
that they do not have to inform their parents they are applying for
asylum if they do not feel comfortable doing so.
E. Allow LGBT Youth With Prior Removal Orders to Reopen Their
Cases and Apply for Asylum
The INA and regulations should be amended to prevent young
people from being denied an opportunity to be heard on their asylum
claim because they were previously ordered removed as a derivative on
a parent's case. The regulations should permit young people to move
to reopen within ninety days of turning twenty-one, or ninety days
after the entry of the removal order, whichever is later. Before entering
a removal order against a derivative child, IJs should be required to
inform her that she has the right to move to reopen her case after
attaining the age of majority. Even without any legislative or
regulatory change, however, due process requires reopening the
immigration cases of young people who were ordered removed
without any opportunity to be heard on their asylum claim.350 Courts
should grant motions to reopen filed by young people who would be
eligible to apply for asylum but for the fact that they were ordered
removed as derivatives of a previous case filed by their parents.
F. Exempt All Children from the One-Year Filing Deadline
All children, not just those who meet the technical definition of an
unaccompanied minor, should be exempt from the requirement to file
for asylum within a year of arriving in the U.S. The regulations state
that being under a "legal disability" is an extraordinary circumstance
350 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An
essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.' ") (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950)).
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that justifies filing for asylum after the one-year deadline.35 ' All
children, not just unaccompanied minors, fall into this category.
Given that twenty-one is the cut off for being considered a "child"
under most immigration laws, courts should consider children exempt
from the one-year deadline until their twenty-first birthday.5 Upon
reaching the age of twenty-one, young people should be afforded a
reasonable period of time to file asylum applications. The regulations
should also be amended to clarify that all children are exempt from
the one-year deadline.
G. Appoint Counsel to Represent Minor Asylum-Seekers
Minor children and other young people who are incapable of
effectively representing themselves in immigration court cannot
receive due process of law without the appointment of an attorney to
represent them.354 Us should, therefore, appoint counsel for children
who are unable to afford an attorney or find a pro bono lawyer to
represent them. Congress should also act to allow indigent children
and young adults seeking asylum the ability to access legal
representation. Congress could allow legal service organizations who
receive federal funding to provide civil legal services to low-income
people to represent undocumented young asylum-seekers in the same
way they can represent undocumented battered immigrants seeking
relief under the Violence Against Women Act.35 ' Alternatively and
perhaps more fittingly, Congress could appropriate money specifically
for the provision of representation to all asylum-seekers in
immigration proceedings. 356 As many commentators have argued, the
351 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2011) (stating that the term "extraordinary
circumstances" may include "legal disability (e.g. the applicant was an unaccompanied
minor ... during the 1-year period after arrival")).
312 Lee Berger and Davina Figeroux, Protecting Accompanied Child Refugees from the
One-Year Deadline: Minority As A Legal Disability, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 855, 858-59
(2002).
3 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(1)(2011) ("The term 'child' means an unmarried
person under twenty-one years of age.").
3 Supra notes 333-342 and accompanying text.
3 Legal services organizations that receive federal funding through the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC) are ordinarily not allowed to assist undocumented
immigrants. But the recent reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act,
permitted LSC funding recipients to provide legal assistance to immigrants who are
victims of domestic violence, trafficking, sexual assault and a variety of other violent
crimes. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-162 § 104, 112 Stat. 2960, 2978 (2006).
356 Cf. RAMJl-NOGALES, supra note 253, at 114 (2009) (recommending that Congress
[Vol. 45:373436
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stakes are so high in determining whether any asylum-seeker will be
returned to a country where she might face persecution and even
death, and the risk of error is so great, that the appointment of counsel
is warranted.35 1
H. Employ a System of Burden Shifting in Cases Where Children Must
Show That Their Native Government Was "Unwilling or Unable" to
Prevent Abuse by Private Actors
Young people who have suffered mistreatment at the hands of
nongovernment actors in their home countries have been denied
asylum on the basis that their government was not "unwilling or
unable" to control the perpetrators.35 ' This decision is often based
solely on whether the child reported her mistreatment to the police. It
ignores the fact that children are not autonomous actors who can
choose to seek police assistance.35 ' To deny a child's asylum claim on
this basis is arbitrary; the decision is based on evidence that does not
demonstrate whether the child's government was actually unwilling or
unable to protect her. Thus, the current evidentiary standard may
prevent children with a genuine fear of persecution from obtaining
asylum.
Asylum adjudicators must adopt a different a different system of
analysis to ensure that young people in need of refuge are not
arbitrarily denied relief. A presumption that the state is unwilling or
unable to control a minor's persecutor should exist where an asylum-
seeker demonstrates that, as a minor, she suffered harm that would
constitute persecution if government acquiescence were established.360
create such a program).
. See Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to be Heard: Voicing the Due Process Right to
Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. TnR WORLD L.J. 41, 59 (2011);
Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Challenging Construction oJ the Fifth-And-A-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461,
1511 (2011); Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & CIv. LIBERTIES 113, 141-42 (2008);
Elizabeth Glazer, Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Asylum Proceedings, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1157, 1157-58 (1985); John R. Mills et al., "Death is Different" and a
Refugee's Right to Counsel 3 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.coml
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1290382.
358 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2011); Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d. 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005).
3 See supra notes 354 -362 and accompanying text.
360 In these cases, the asylum applicant has established that she suffered very
serious harm that it would constitute persecution if her government was unwilling or
unable to control the perpetrator. It is also undisputed that the applicant's government
did not prevent this harm from occurring. It therefore seems logical that the
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DHS should then bear the burden of proving that the child's
government was in fact willing and able to control the perpetrators."'
This would ensure that decisions about whether a young person
qualifies for asylum are made on the basis of evidence that is actually
probative of whether the applicant's government was unwilling or
unable to protect her. It would also place the evidentiary burden on
the U.S. government, which is the party with the most resources and
access to information about international affairs and policing in
foreign nations.
In addition, the flight of children from their home countries is such
an extreme event that it justifies additional protections for applicants
who are seeking asylum while still minor children. In cases where a
minor child is the principal applicant, even the burden-shifting
scheme described above may not be adequate to ensure a decision is
rendered on the basis of the best available evidence. 6 In those
situations, the child should also be entitled to call an expert witness, at
government expense if necessary, to refute DHS's evidence regarding
her government's willingness or ability to protect her from persecution
by private actors.
Frequently, DHS and IJs rely on documentary evidence in the form
of a State Department Report to establish the human rights conditions
in an asylum applicant's country of origin.363 Appellate courts
consistently question this practice.3 6' These reports frequently contain
presumption should be that the government was unwilling or unable to control the
perpetrators. After all, the harm happened, and so by definition the government did
not prevent it. That suggests the government was either unwilling or unable to do so.
Such evidence should therefore be sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of
demonstrating her government's acquiescence in the harm she suffered.
361 DHS could meet that burden by showing that the applicant's attackers were
arrested, convicted, and imprisoned, and she suffered no further harm, for example, or
by proving that such violence against LGBT people is an anomaly in the country.
362 Children are likely to be particularly unsophisticated regarding the political
situation or policing practices in their country of origin, which would make it almost
impossible for them to refute whatever evidence DHS produces in support of the
proposition that the child's government was in fact willing and able to protect her
from harm.
36 Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on America's
Asylum System, 2 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 1, 10, 12 (2007) (describing asylum
adjudicators' "chronic overreliance" on "generalized summaries of recent country
conditions" by the State Department).
36 See Tian-Yong Chen v. I.N.S., 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[Tihe
immigration court cannot assume that a report produced by the State Department-an
agency of the Executive Branch of Government that is necessarily bound to be
concerned to avoid abrading relations with other countries, especially other major
world powers-presents the most accurate picture of human rights in the country at
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little information about the treatment of LGBT people. As a practical
matter, there is no way to know from reading the report why that
document does not contain more information about the situation
confronting LGBT people. It might be because LGBT communities face
no violence or human rights problems. Another possible explanation
is that LGBT people are so invisible and oppressed within the society
at issue that attacks against them are never reported or recorded. A
live expert can be questioned as to these matters, ensuring that the IJ
gets an accurate picture of the conditions in the country.
The ability to produce expert testimony, at government expense if
necessary, allows child asylum-seekers to refute any biased or
inaccurate testimony presented by DHS. The U.S. Government has
argued that it cannot provide counsel to unaccompanied children in
removal proceedings because the INA allows them to be represented
by an attorney only "at no expense to the government."" Whether
this amounts to a prohibition on providing government-funded
counsel in removal proceedings is an open question, of course, but it
certainly would not preclude the provision of an expert witness to
testify in support of a child's claim.
The Supreme Court has held that the government must pay for a
psychiatric expert to evaluate the defendant in a death penalty case
when his mental health will be a significant factor at trial."' A death
penalty defendant also has a constitutional right to the assistance of a
psychiatric expert witness where the government puts his future
dangerousness at issue in the sentencing phase. 6 ' In holding that
defendants must be granted such assistance, the Supreme Court noted
that "where the consequence of error is so great, the relevance of
responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the
State so slim, due process requires access to [a psychiatric expert
witness]."' While the Court has emphasized that "death is different,"
that does not mean that child asylum-seekers facing removal to their
issue."); Galina v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The country report is
evidence and sometimes the only evidence available, but the [BIA] should treat it with
a healthy skepticism, rather than, as is its tendency, as Holy Writ."); Shah v. I.N.S.,
220 F.3d 1062, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gramatikov v. I.N.S., 128 F.3d at
620); Gailius v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d at 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); Gramatikov v. I.N.S.,
128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]here is perennial concern that the Department
softpedals human rights violations by countries that the United States wants to have
good relations with.").
365 Immigration and Nationality Act § 292, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (2011).
"66 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
36 Id. at 84.
36 Id.
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countries of origin do not enjoy analogous due process rights.369
Immigration proceedings where a refugee is seeking asylum,
withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against
Torture are arguably analogous to death penalty cases because the
applicant may face death if the claim is wrongly rejected. 70 One tragic
example is that of Edgar Chocoy, a sixteen-year-old boy who fled
Guatemala after leaving a street gang.37' He was murdered just
seventeen days after being deported following the denial of his asylum
application.
Given the risk of death confronting a child who is wrongly denied
asylum, due process requires obtaining an accurate picture of the
asylum seeker's home country's willingness or ability to protect her
from persecution by private actors. Establishing two requirements
would ensure that IJs receive the most accurate information available.
The first would require DHS to prove that a child applicant's
government is willing and able to control the private individuals who
harmed her. The second would ensure that the child is entitled to
present her own expert testimony - available without cost to her -
in rebuttal. These two requirements would ensure that child asylum-
seekers' claims are decided on the basis of the best available evidence
regarding the conditions in her country. Such an effort is vital to
ensure that children who have taken the extraordinary step of crossing
an international border to escape mistreatment are not wrongly
removed to face further persecution.
I. Advocates for Young LGBT Asylum-Seekers Should Use Expert
Testimony
LGBT youths seeking asylum are burdened by a number of
stereotypes that undermine adjudicators' ability to accurately evaluate
the seriousness of the harm that they have suffered. The perception
that children cannot comprehend or accurately articulate their sexual
orientation or gender identity is one example. Another is the
perception that LGBT people are hypersexual and less affected by
sexual violence than heterosexuals. Overcoming such stereotypes
requires trial-based interventions to convince the finder of fact that the
child has suffered real harm. Expert witness testimony can prove
369 See Mills et al., supra note 357, at 3.
370 See id.
371 Sergio DeLeon, Guatemalan Youth Slain 17 Days After Being Deported from U.S.,




particularly valuable in countering stereotypes and other "common
sense" dominant narratives."
Expert witness testimony could serve to educate the adjudicator
about the impact of the persecution the LGBT child suffered. In
particular, an expert witness could draw on recent research
concerning the profound impact family and community rejection has
on young LGBT people. This research would show that being singled
out for violent abuse because of his or her sexual orientation or gender
identity can profoundly impact a child's development and adult
functioning." Attorneys representing LGBT youth in asylum cases
should, therefore, consider utilizing expert testimony to bolster their
clients' claims.
J. LGBT Youth Should Consider Filing for Asylum on the Basis of
"Imputed Sexual Orientation"
Young transgender and bisexual people face a particular challenge in
applying for asylum because no court has ruled that either of those
identities constitutes a "particular social group" within the meaning of
the INA. In addition to arguing for court recognition, transgender and
bisexual youths can also apply for asylum on the basis of imputed
sexual orientation." For a transgender girl, for example, doing so
would allow her to state honestly that she does not identify as a "gay
man with a female sexual identity" but is still subject to anti-gay
persecution because she was designated male at birth and is attracted
to men and is, thus, assumed to be gay.7 A heterosexual man who
faced persecution because people believed he was gay qualified for
asylum because of his "imputed status as a homosexual."" There is
37 See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1271 n.93; Miller, supra note 11, at 153.
1 See generally Caitlin Ryan, David Huebner & Jorge Sanchez, Family Rejection as
a Predictor of Negative Health Outcomes in White and Latino Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Young Adults, 123 PEDIATRICS 346 (2009) (finding a predictive link between negative
family reactions to a child's sexual orientation and serious health problems for the
adolescent in young adulthood, such as depression, illegal drug use, risk for HIV
infection, and suicide attempts).
" See Neilson, Uncharted Territory: Choosing an Effective Approach in Transgender-
Based Asylum Claims, supra note 83, at 285-86.
376 Id. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) similarly prohibits
discrimination against a person who is "regarded as" disabled by her employer, even
though she does not actually suffer from a disability that would qualify her for
protection under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). Thus an employer who
discriminates against a person because she perceives him to be disabled violates the
ADA even if the victim does not actually have a disability. Id.
" Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 730 (3d Cir. 2003).
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no reason why a bisexual or transgender young person cannot also
apply on that basis.
Imputed sexual orientation claims on behalf of young bisexual and
transgender people make practical sense because persecutors may not
see lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people as distinct identities.
Rather, a persecutor might have the same homophobic reaction to all
LGBT people and target a gay man or a transgender woman alike for
violent abuse. For example, a transgender girl who is attacked by a
group of young men calling her a "faggot" has suffered persecution on
the grounds of imputed sexual orientation; her attackers assumed
incorrectly that she is gay.1 8 Applying for asylum on the basis of
imputed sexual orientation also makes sense for lesbian and gay young
people. "Homosexuals" are clearly established as a social group, but
adjudicators frequently cannot accept that children are really gay. 7
Consequently judges deny young people asylum because they failed to
produce "objective evidence" of their sexual orientation even when
such evidence simply does not exist.380 Gay and lesbian young people
could avoid this catch-22 by applying for asylum on the basis of
imputed sexual orientation as well as on the basis of their actual
sexual identity. Doing so would allow applicants to argue that it does
not matter whether the IJ believes they are actually gay or not. In an
imputed sexual orientation asylum case, the applicant's true identity is
irrelevant - the only issue is whether he will be targeted for anti-gay
mistreatment .38 An applicant who had been subjected to horrific anti-
gay abuse in the past would be eligible for asylum on the basis of
imputed sexual orientation if he would be targeted again in the future;
the I could not deny the application even if he thought the asylum-
seeker had not produced enough "objective evidence ... [of] his
homosexuality"38 2 to prove he was gay.
378 "Many persecutors use slang terminology for transgender persons synonymous
with derogatory terms like 'fag' or 'dyke,' demonstrating that, from the persecutor's
perspective, transgender identity and homosexual identity are synonymous." Landau,
supra note 62, at 260-61.
3 See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
380 See supra Part I .B.
38 See Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 730 (remanding Amanfi's petition for review for the
BIA to determine the extent of his persecution on account of his imputed status as a
homosexual).




Recent developments in both juvenile law and the legal rights of
sexual minorities are remarkable in their challenges to long-held
assumptions about children and LGBT people. In its recent decisions
limiting the criminal penalties that can be constitutionally imposed
upon minors, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that children who
commit adult-like acts cease to be children. The Court instead
indicated that all children must be given special solicitude because
they are biologically different from adults. These decisions establish
that courts can no longer treat a child as an adult simply because he
has committed adult-like acts. Courts have also proscribed a variety of
forms of discrimination against sexual minorities, even when that
discrimination ostensibly targets "behavior" rather than "status." But,
contrary to these holdings, young LGBT asylum-seekers have
continued to be denied relief on the basis of outmoded thinking about
youth and sexuality. Asylum adjudicators continue to hold young
LGBT asylum-seekers to an adult standard of persecution and to
disregard severe mistreatment perpetrated against them. Similarly,
while recent legal developments with regard to the rights of sexual
minorities clearly indicate that judicial reliance on homophobic
stereotypes is inappropriate, young LGBT asylum applicants continue
to have their cases denied on the basis of outdated misconceptions
about LGBT people.
Ensuring that LGBT youth receive due process and fair treatment
requires a number of reforms to the adjudication of child asylum-
seekers' claims. Only with substantive and procedural changes to
asylum adjudication can young LGBT asylum-seekers realize the
promise of recent advances in both juvenile law and the legal rights of
sexual minorities. At present, these young peoples' cases show there is
a long way to go before LGBT youth realize the gains made on behalf
of (presumptively heterosexual) children and LGBT adults.
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